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This thesis examines the use of the U.S. Armed Forces in civil authority support 
missions along the U.S.-Mexico border from the creation of the boundary between the 
U.S. and Mexico in 1848, to the post-September 11th border security support operations.  
Many questions arise from using the military in this capacity, for example; how effective 
is the military’s support to civil authorities (MSCA), can the military perform MSCA 
operation without the threat to human and rights of civilians, how do MSCA missions 
such as these impact the combat readiness of the military?  This thesis found that military 
support to civil authorities was indeed effective, especially with in cases where non-
federalizes National Guard personnel were employed.  It also shows that the military has 
implemented control measures that enable troops to conduct law enforcement support 
missions while respecting the human and civil rights of civilians.  Lastly , it found that the 
combat readiness the military was not necessarily diminished, but could actually be 
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I. SECURITY ALONG THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER: 
EVALUATING THE ROLE OF THE U.S. MILITARY 
Since the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 
2001, Homeland Security became an important issue to the United States.  A new sense 
of national vulnerability has forced the United States to reexamine its security posture.  
Immediately after the attacks, the military (both active duty and reserve forces) deployed 
to airports, nuclear power plants, vital dams and bridges and the national borders to guard 
against further terrorist attacks.  However, previous to September 11 th, the U.S. military 
was already being used extensively along the U.S.-Mexico border for a variety of 
counter-narcotic missions.  Along with continuing the counter-drug operations, the 
military has also provided support to civil authorities tasked with keeping terrorists and 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from crossing over the border from Mexico.   
 
Since the end of the U.S.  war with Mexico in 1848 that established the present 
U.S.-Mexican boundaries, the border has represented a challenge for the United States to 
control.  Many problems ranging from illegal immigration, to weapons and narcotic 
smuggling, to aggressive criminal and military incursions have occurred along the border.  
Throughout the 154 years of history since the creation of the international border, the 
U.S. military has been deployed to and across the border to address these issues.  
Deployment of the military to the border has produced both mixed results and mixed 
public reaction.   
 
Perhaps the largest and most known use of the military on and across the Mexican 
border was General John “Blackjack” Pershing’s punitive expedition against Francisco 
“Pancho” Villa in response to Villa’s attack on Columbus, New Mexico, on March 9, 
1916.  Although Pershing’s forces received valuable training for their entry into World 
2 
War One, the commitment of thousands of U.S. soldiers (federal and militia) failed to 
punish Pancho Villa and U.S. relations with Mexico were severely strained.1  
On May 28, 1924, the U.S. Border Patrol was formed to protect the nation from 
illegal immigration.  The Border Patrol is tasked with performing the demanding and 
complex task of preventing the smuggling and unlawful entry of undocumented aliens in 
the United States, apprehending immigration law violators and serving as the primary 
agency responsible for drug and contraband interdiction between ports of entry.2  The 
Border Patrol is joined by other federal, state, and local law enforcement organizations in 
support of its border policing and drug interdiction operations.3  The “most controversial 
partner, as viewed from both sides of the border, has clearly been the U.S. military.”4  
The support of drug enforcement efforts along the border by both active component 
military and the National Guard has sparked both official and media protests in the 
United States and Mexico.  
 
Beginning in the early 1990s, the National Guard from the southwest border states 
(California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas) began to assign full -time, active-duty 
Guardsmen to counternarcotic law enforcement agency support duties along the Mexican 
border.  In addition, active duty troops also provided assistance to law enforcement.  The 
support offered by the military included listening post/observation post (LPOP) teams, 
radio and camera room operators, x-ray equipment operators and cargo/vehicle inspectors 
(supporting U.S. Customs Service at the POEs), fixed and rotary winged  aircraft 
surveillance platforms, and field craft training (land navigation, map reading, and 
patrolling techniques).    
 
                                          
1  (Author/Date not cited), President Wilson’s “War with Mexico”, 
http://gi.grolier.com/presidents/aee/bios/28pwils.html .  
2  Turbiville, Jr., Graham H. (1999), US-Mexican Border Security: Civil-Military Cooperation, Military Review 
(July-August 1999),  Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, p. 1.  
3  Turbiville, Jr., (1999), p. 2. 
4  President Wilson’s, War with Mexico, found at: http://gi.grolier.com/presidents/aee/bios/28pwils.html -accessed.  
3 
Despite the popularity of the military with the law enforcement agencies that they 
support, other groups argue that the military should not be involved in civilian law 
enforcement and fear that the border with Mexico will become militarized. 5  These fears 
were realized in May of 1997 when a U.S. Marine Corps team (while conducting LP/OP 
operations along the border near Redford, Texas) shot and killed Esequiel Hernandez, an 
American citizen.  An investigation of the shooting found that the Marine corporal in 
charge of the team had acted within the existing rules of engagement (ROE) and was not 
subject to military or civil prosecution.6  The “Redford Incident” resulted in a temporary 
suspension of  “armed missions” (the carrying and use of firearms by military personnel) 
and caused both civil and military leaders to re-think how the military could 
appropriately support law enforcement author ities on the U.S.-Mexico border. 
 
Deploying the military for operations along the Mexican border raises many 
important questions.  What role (type and scope of missions) is appropriate for the 
military’s support of law enforcement along the border?  What missions are the military 
“uniquely qualified” to perform, in other words, what can soldiers do that civil authorities 
cannot?  How effective is the military in the performance of non-traditional, civil-support 
missions?  Can the military perform its missio n without violating U.S. Posse Comitatus 
laws?  Can soldiers be restrained from violating the human rights of U.S. citizens and 
foreign nationals?  How does the border mission impact the military’s primary mission of 
training and preparation for war?  In sum, is the military “the right tool” for the job?   
 
The purpose of my thesis is to answer these questions and to provide a model for 
effective use of the U.S. military along the border with Mexico. Chapter II will briefly 
cover the history of using the military in support of civil authorities along the U.S.-
Mexican border.  It will also explore the range of roles and missions in which the military 
has been employed along the border, focusing on the military’s on -going counterdrug and 
                                          
5  Dunn, Timothy, 1996, The Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border, 1978-1992: Low-Intensity Conflict 
Doctrine Comes Home, (Austin: CMAS Books, University of Texas, 1996).  
6  Turbiville Jr., Graham H., (1999), U.S.-Mexican Border Security: Civil-Military Cooperation, Military Review, 
July-August 1999, p. 2, Found at: http://call.army.mil/fmso/fmsopubs/issues/border/bord.  
4 
the post September 11th security missions in support of border law enforcement 
operations.  
 
Chapter III will discuss the effectiveness of using the military to assist law 
enforcement officials in enforcing customs, immigration, and narcotic laws along the 
border.  The performance measurements of effectiveness used by law enforcement and 
the military will be examined to evaluate the value of military support to civil authorities.  
In addition, the question of whether the military is uniquely qualified to perform these 
missions and their level of effectiveness compared to standard law enforcement assets 
will be addressed.  The chapter finds that military support to civil authorities can be very 
effective under the proper conditions.  First, civil and military leaders must plan and 
prepare in advance for emergency joint operations.  Second, the effectiveness of the 
National Guard’s support of law enforcement authorities is shaped by whether troops are 
mobilized in a federal or state status.  Federalized National Guard troops can be s everely 
hampered by posse comitatus laws – laws that do not apply to the Guard while operating 
under their Governor’s control.  
 
Chapter IV will examine the possible dangers to civil liberties posed by the 
military along the border.  This chapter will examine the fears of the opponents of the 
military’s support of border law enforcement operations and evaluate whether the legal 
framework that authorizes military’s support to civil authorities (including Posse 
Comitatus restrictions) and special training meas ures have been successful in protecting 
private citizens rights from possible military overuse of authority.  The chapter 
demonstrates that military support to civil authorities does not automatically equate to 
human and civil rights violations at the hands of the troops.  For much of the history of 
the use of the armed forces in support of civilian law enforcement operations, human and 
civil rights infractions by the military have been rare.  Furthermore, after tragic incidents 
like the shooting of civilians at Kent State University, Ohio, and Redford, Texas, 
corrective measures were enacted by the military to prevent future reoccurrences of such 
tragedies.  This chapter will also show that annual civil disturbance training and the 
5 
community-based nature of the National Guard make it better prepared than the Active 
Component of the military to provide support to civil authorities with a greatly reduced 
chance of human or civil rights violations. 
 
Chapter V will look into the effects of military support in border security missions 
on the readiness of military units.  Is combat readiness degraded when military units 
focus their attention on law enforcement support missions or can readiness actually be 
improved through missions that support civil authorities?  T he chapter argues that support 
missions that actually involve the service member’s military “warfighter” skills can 
improve individual and unit readiness.  In particular, in the case of the National Guard’s 
counternarcotic operations, the personnel who sup port law enforcement agencies on a 
full-time basis, while attending traditional Individual Duty Training (IDT -training 
conducted one weekend a month) and Annual Training (AT -two weeks of uninterrupted 
training) with their military units show greater levels  of warfighter skills, physical fitness, 
and “deployability” than their non-counterdrug operation counterparts.  In contrast, the 
federalization of National Guard personnel for civil authority support missions can have a 
negative impact on readiness by preventing the service member from participating in 
their unit’s training events that helps sustain their readiness.   
 
Lastly, I will argue that a negative public perception of a support operation can 
have an adverse impact on readiness.  The military must enjoy public support for its 
training activities and sites; loss of support can spell loss of training opportunities that 
will weaken readiness.  All requests should be carefully reviewed to avoid missions that 
offer possible bad public reaction. 
 
Chapter V will conclude my thesis by reviewing the main issues and key findings 
of the thesis.  It will also answer the central question of the appropriateness of using 
military members to help enforce laws along the U.S.-Mexican border.  This chapter will 
include recommendations for civilian and military leaders who are faced with the 
6 
challenges of planning and executing military support to border law enforcement 
agencies.   
7 
II. THE HISTORY OF U.S. MILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVIL 
AUTHORITY ON THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER 
The U.S.-Mexico border, as we know it today, was established over 150 years ago 
by two separate “feat of arms.”  The success of the Texans in their war for independence 
created the boundary between the new nation of the “Republic of Texas” and Mexico in 
1836.  In 1845, less than a decade after the founding of the Republic of Texas, it was 
peacefully annexed into the United States as its 28 th state.  The annexation stirred the 
tension that already existed between the United States and Mexico and the two nations 
were soon at war.  The United States prevailed in the U.S. -Mexican War (1846-47) and 
the resulting Treaty of Hidalgo in 1848 led to “more than half of the territory of Mexico 
becoming one third of the territory of the United States.”7  
 
The use of military forces along the border did not end with its establishment in 
1848.  To the contrary, often when the United States has been faced with great problems 
along the border that seem to overwhelm civil authorities, the military has been called in 
to help civilian agencies correct the problem and restore order.  This pattern of 
mobilizing the military to aid civilian law enforcement agencies along the border in times 
of crisis has repeated itself on numerous occasions throughout history.  The tendency to 
rely on the military when civil authority resources are outmatched by cross-border 
criminals is understandable.  The military possesses large amounts of sophisticated 
equipment designed to see and “rapidly close in” on, and if necessary, destroy an enemy.8  
Also, traditionally the American people have held the U.S. military in very high esteem, 
and trusts that the military possesses the right manpower, training and skills to get the 
nation’s toughest jobs done.  Whether threatened by violent, cross -border insurgents, 
drug traffickers, illegal immigrants, or terrorists attempting to gain access into the United 
States, since 1848, the U.S. armed forces have played a major role in supporting civil 
authorities maintain control of the southwest border.  
                                          
7  Turbiville Jr., Graham H., (1999), p. 30. 
8  Routers, Peter, (1988), Can the Borders be Sealed?, in Peter Router, Gordon Crawford, and Jonathon Cave, 
eds., Sealing the Borders (Santa Monica, California: The RAND Corporation, 1988).  
8 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine such of the use of the armed forces 
along the U.S.-Mexico border in support of civil authorities.  The chapter will be broken 
down into four sections, each one dealing with a different historical period. The first 
section examines the early U.S. military response to Mexican insurgents along the new 
border between the United States and Mexico.  The second section looks into the causes 
of Pancho Villa’s raid on Columbus, New Mexico, and the United States military’s 
response to the raid .  The third section discusses the introduction of the military to the 
efforts of civilian law enforcement agencies’ “war on drugs” along the U.S. -Mexico 
border.  Finally, the last section describes how the U.S. armed forces were employed to 
support civilian authorities charged with heightened post-September 11th security 
operations at the ports of entry (POE) on the U.S. southwest border.  
 
A. EARLY MILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES: THE 
“CORTINA WAR” (1859-60) 
The establishment of the border with Mexic o did not bring peace to the region.  
Challenging the “appropriation of land by the United States Anglos and the treatment of 
the Mexicans and new Mexican-Americans,” Juan Nepomuceno Cortina formed an army 
and in the fall of 1859, began the “Cortina War.”  Cortina’s forces were able to occupy 
the town of Brownsville, Texas, and for a short period of time, controlled parts of the 
Lower Rio Grande valley.9 
 
In response to the violence, Texas governor Hardin Runnels sent the Texas 
Rangers, supported by a company of United States Army “regulars,” to stop Cortina.  
According to Texas Ranger history, the forces combined for a campaign that lasted nearly 
sixty days.10  Supported by Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Lee's United States cavalry, the 
Texas Rangers defeated Cortina forces in three straight battles.  With his men thoroughly 
beaten, Juan Cortina and his “army” retreated across the border and into Mexico, thus 
                                          
9  Turbiville, (1999), p. 30. 
10  Found at: http://www.alvyray.com/Family/Stories/TexasRanger.htm.  
9 
ending the “Cortina War.”11  But even after Cortina’s forces had fled to Mexico, sporadic 
cross-border attacks on Americans continued into the 1870s.  Eventually the combined 
actions of Captain Lee McNelly’s Texas Rangers and the U.S. military put an end to Juan 
Cortina’s cross-border violence.12    
 
B. PANCHO VILLA’S ATTACK ON COLUMBUS, NEW MEXICO, AND 
GENERAL PERSHING’S PUNITI VE EXPEDITION  
Angered over the U.S. support for the Mexican “Constitutionalist” government 
that he was revolting against, Francisco “Pancho” Villa began planning a retaliatory 
attack against the United States.13  Early in the morning of March 9, 1916, Pancho Villa 
with over 600 revolutionary soldiers attacked the small border town of Columbus, New 
Mexico, and Camp Furlong where the U.S. 13 th Cavalry Regiment was posted.14  
Although the raid took the town and the U.S. Army totally by surpr ise, quick reactions by 
the soldiers of the 13th Cavalry enabled them to make effective use of their machine guns 
against Villa’s forces.  As dawn began to break, the attack ended with the “Villistas” 
withdrawing back across the Mexican border.  Left in Villa’s wake were 10 civilians 
murdered, 8 U.S. soldiers killed, and close to 100 of his own men dead.  
 
In response to the attack on Columbus, President Woodrow Wilson sent Brigadier 
General John “Blackjack” Pershing into Mexico to lead the “Punitive Expedit ion” against 
Villa and his forces.  In addition to sending the Army into Mexico, Wilson also 
federalized 75,000 National Guardsmen into service to assist in border security.15  During 
the pursuit, “Villa cleverly drew Pershing so deeply into the country tha t the Mexican 
government threatened war.”16  After a clash between U.S. and Mexican forces at 
                                          
11  Found at: http://www.alvyray.com/Family/Stories/TexasRanger.htm.  
12  Turbiville, (1999), p. 30. 
13  Telles-McGeagh, Maria, (1991), In Search of Pancho Villa, Borderlands Research Monograph Series No. 6, 
Border Research Institute New Mexico State University, Los Cruces, New Mexico 88003, pp. 40 -43.  
14  Dean, Richard R., (1994), The Columbus Story, J & J Publishing, Deming, New Mexico, p. 1. 
15  Author not cited, The Army on the Mexican Border, Chapter 16, Transition and Change, 1902 -1917, American 
Military History, found at: http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/AMH/AMH-16.htm. 
16  Author/date not cited, President Wilson’s War with Mexico found at: 
http://gi.grolier.com/presidents/ea/bios/28pwils.html .- 
10 
Carrizal, President Wilson withdrew the expedition in January 1917 and averted a war 
with Mexico.  Despite the commitment of thousands of U.S. soldiers (federal an d militia) 
and millions of dollars, the expedition failed.  Pancho Villa was not punished and a war 
was nearly started with Mexico.17  
 
C. THE MILITARY ENTERS THE “WAR ON DRUGS” 
Limited military support to law enforcement authorities engaged in counterdrug 
operations began during the Nixon Era. 18  This early involvement was limited to U.S. 
Coast Guard support to the Customs Service. 19  However in 1981, Congress through 
Public Law 97-86 amended the Posse Comitatus Act to permit the other branches of the 
military to assist law enforcement agencies in the war against drugs.20 
 
Despite these efforts, America in the 1980s was facing what many considered to 
be an epidemic of drug abuse, particularly with cocaine.  Illegal narcotics were identified 
as a threat to national security and stemming the growth in their use in the United States 
became a priority in Washington.  To further amplify the military’s efforts in this arena, 
on April 8, 1986, President Reagan implemented National Security Directive Number 
221 (NSD # 221) “Narcotics and National Security.”  NSD #221 identified illegal drug 
use as a threat to the nation’s security and called for more active military support for the 
counter-narcotics operations of law enforcement agencies: 
The Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General, in conjunction with 
the Secretary of State, should develop and implement any necessary 
modifications to applicable statutes, regulations, procedures, and 
guidelines to enable U.S. military forces to support counter -narcotics 
efforts more actively, consistent with the maintenance of force readiness 
and training.21 
                                          
17  Author/date not cited, President Wilson’s War with Mexico found at: 
http://gi.grolier.com/presidents/ea/bios/28pwils.html .- 
18  Shaffer, David W. Lieutenant Colonel, U.S.A. (2000), An Analysis of the Military’s Role in America’s 
Counterdrug Operations, Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013 -5050, p. 1. 
19  Shaffer (2000), p. 1. 
20  Shaffer (2000), p. 1. 
21  National Security Directive Number 221, April 8, 1986, p. 3.  
11 
Late in 1988, the U.S. military’s active participation in America’s fight against 
illegal narcotics was further expanded by the George W. Bush administration through 
Public Law 100-456 that created amendments to USC Title 10, Chapter 18.22  The 
changes to public law now required the Department of Defense (DoD ) “to serve as the 
lead agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal 
drugs into the United States.”23  It also required the DoD, “to the maximum extent 
practicable,” to consider the needs of civil law enforcement agencies when planning and  
conducting military training or operations.24  The Secretary of Defense was now 
authorized to not only make available military equipment and facilities for law 
enforcement authorities, but also the personnel to train law enforcement agents in the 
operation and maintenance of equipment.  Finally, Public Law 100 -456 authorized the 
DoD to provide the funds “sufficient to pay for all expenses of the National Guard of 
such State when engaged in drug interdiction assistance activities.”25 
 
The military quickly responded to the new MSCA mission.  By November of 
1988, just three months after beginning its new mission th e military created Joint Task 
Force-6 (JTF-6) at Fort Bliss, Texas, near El Paso.26  The mission of JTF-6 was to “serve 
as a planning and coordinating headquarters to provide support from the Defense 
Department to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.”27  Much of the support 
that JTF-6 has coordinated has been focused along the U.S.-Mexico border region.28  
Following shortly behind the Active duty military, the National Guard Bureau began 
establishing counter narcotic programs throughout the Unit ed States and the territories.  
                                          
22  Pub. L. 100-456, div. A, title XI, Sec. 1104 (a), Sept. 29, 1988, 102 Stat. 2043, Found at: 
http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/372.notes.html.  
23  H.R.4481 Public Law: 100-456 (09/29/88) SPONSOR: Rep. D. Armey (introduced 04/28/88)  Found at: 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d100:HR0448:@@@D|TOM:/bss/d100query.html.|  
24  H.R.4481 Public Law: 100-456 (09/29/88) SPONSOR: Rep. D. Armey (introduced 04/28/88)  Found at: 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d100:HR0448:@@@D|TOM:/bss/d100query.html|  
25  H.R.4481 Public Law: 100-456 (09/29/88) SPONSOR: Rep. D. Armey (introduced 04/28/88)  Found at: 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d100:HR0448:@@@D|TOM:/bss/d100query.html.|  
26  Dunn, Timothy, (1996), The Militarization of the U.S. -Mexico Border, 1978-1992: Low-Intensity Conflict 
Doctrine Comes Home, (Austin: CMAS Books, University of Texas, 1996), p. 133.  
27  Dunn, Timothy, (1996), p. 134. 
28  Dunn, Timothy, (1996), p. 137. 
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The new National Guard organizations had a mission similar to that of JTF-6 but, instead 
of relying on “rotational troops” (units that would leave their home base for a counter 
drug operation, then return to base at the clos e of the mission), they provided most of the 
support through their own full-time, counterdrug ranks.  The California, Texas, and 
Arizona programs, which have very heavy law enforcement commitments on the U.S. -
Mexico border, are the largest in the nation.   
 
The combined Active Components (U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps) and the 
National Guard have been used in a wide variety of support to civil authority missions 
along the United States border with Mexico.  Almost solely focused on missions with a 
“counter-drug nexus,” the military participates in a diverse range of operations that 
include: training law enforcement agents in field craft, patrolling techniques, and 
sophisticated thermal imaging/night vision equipment operations, conducting both air and 
ground reconnaissance missions, providing listening post/observation post support to law 
enforcement agencies, and the monitoring of radio/camera rooms.  
 
Following the increased counterdrug responsibilities was increased funding to 
support the counterdrug MSCA missions.  For example, in 1990, the DoD received $450 
million for drug-interdiction and counterdrug activities.29  This represented a 50% 
increase in DoD counterdrug funding over the previous fiscal year.30  The National 
Guard also benefited from the increased budget with leaps in funding from $40 million in 
1989, to $110 million in 1990 ($70 million for counterdrug operations and 40 million for 
support equipment), and an estimated $163 million in 1991.  Of the $70 million budgeted 
in 1990 for counterdrug operations nationally, Arizona, California, New Mexico, and 
Texas combined received $21.8 million.31  Today the annual counterdrug budgets for the 
four southwestern border-states has risen to $50 million out of the total $182 million for 
                                          
29  Dunn, (1996), p. 119 (From the “National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal years 1990 and 1991”: sec 
1208).  
30  Dunn, (1996), p. 119. 
31  Dunn, (1996), p. 124. 
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the entire National Guard.32  This represents a 44% increase in counternarcotic operations 
budget for the southwestern border -states in 12 years.  
 
D. THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11TH SUPPORT MISSIONS  
During the weeks following the attacks on September 11th, the Department of 
Defense began to receive requests from law enforcement agencies to provide troops to 
support the new, heightened security measures to guard against further terrorist attacks.  
The security of U.S. borders became a special concern after September 11 th and, 
according to Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge, the borders with Canada and 
Mexico are vulnerable to terrorists.33  The federal law enforcement agencies responsible 
for the control of the U.S. borders -- United States Customs Service (USCS), United 
States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and the United States Border Patrol 
(USBP) -- submitted requests for military support to help with the new heightened 
security measures being implemented at the nation’s borders.34  To emphasize the 
criticality of the need to bolster security at the borders to prevent terrorist entry, 
Representative Jim Ramstad (R. -Minn.) stated that, “We must use all necessary 
resources and that unavoidably means using our military.”35 
 
The concerns over border security stemmed from INS estimates of that between 
1.2 and 2.4 million illegal aliens successfully gain entry to the United States each year.  
Since these illegal aliens have not gone through pre-visa background checks, nor have 
they been identified or interviewed, it is impossib le to determine how many terrorists are 
entering the country.36  With the three major border law enforcement agencies focusing 
their resources on preventing terrorists from crossing the border, the military would 
                                          
32  National Guard Bureau, Counter/Drug State Plans Budget for FY03, SFC Scott Martin, Southwest border 
coordinator, NGB/CD.  
33  Rivera, Ray (2002), Beefed -Up Border Security Delayed It’ll Be A Month As Feds Take Control, The Seattle 
Times, February 13, 2002.  
34  No Author Cited, U.S. Troops to Secure Mexican Border , The Associated Press, February 24, 2001. 
35  D’agostino, Joseph A. (2002), Put U.S. Troops on U.S. Borders, Human Events, 24 June 2002, Vol. 58, Issue 
24, p. 1.  
36  D’agostino, Joseph A., (2002).  
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provide the support needed to free-up more law enforcement agents to help secure the 
border.37 
 
Early in November 2001, the military began to send troops to the ports of entry 
(POE) on U.S. international borders.  Although the first troops to arrive to the Mexican 
border were National Guard personnel under the command of their state’s governor (U.S. 
Code Title 32), they were later called to federal active duty (U.S. Code Title 10) and 
served under an active component Army command structure.  For more than six months, 
approximately 378 military members provided support to civil authorities along the 
southwest border.38  The troops conducted support missions, largely involving the 
inspection of vehicles and cargo containers, and other unarmed security details around 
the POEs.  By the spring of 2002, addit ional law enforcement officers had been brought 
to the U.S.-Mexico border and began to assume the missions previously accomplished by 
the military.  After over a half of a year of post September 11th support service to U.S. 
border authorities, the mission ended and the National Guard troops were released and 
returned to their homes and to state control.  
 
Despite this recall of personnel, the security of the nation’s borders continues to 
be threatened by drug traffickers and terrorists and the military remains an important part 
of national plans to defend the border.  If history is any indication, it is likely that 
additional military personnel will again be called to support law enforcement authorities 
on the U.S.-Mexico border in times of crisis in the near  future.  For over 150 years, the 
military has provided support to aid civilian law enforcement agencies along the border 
in times of crisis.  Armed with technologically advanced equipment, and possessing 
trained, disciplined personnel, the military can offer resources that are often unavailable 
to law enforcement authorities.  History has shown that the military is capable of 
                                          
37  Ellington, Ken (2002), Guard Troops Ma y Be Assigned to Mexican Border , Los Angeles Times, California 
Metro, Part 2, p. 1, February 23, 2002. 
38  Rotstein, Arthur H. (2002), National Guard Deployment Helping Customs on Mexican Border Ends , The 
Associated Press State & Local Wire, May 16, 2002, BC Cycle.  
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providing support to civil authorities during emergencies on the southwest border, but 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
17 
III. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVIL 
AUTHORITIES ALONG THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER 
Since the late 1980s, the military has been providing personnel and equipment to 
help law enforcement agencies interdict the flow of illegal drugs entering the U.S. 
through the Mexican border.  Every year, hundreds of millions of dollars are provided by 
the Department of Defense to Joint Task Force-6 (the main coordinating agency for 
active-duty military operations) and to the National Guard Counterdrug programs in the 
Southwest border-states (Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California) to fund their 
counternarcotic law enforcement support missions.  Following the  terrorist attacks on 
September 11th, 2001, additional military missions were also funded to provide help to 
the civil authorities responsible for preventing terrorists and weapons of mass destruction 
from entering the U.S. through the ports of entry.  
 
Those who question the effectiveness of military support to civil authorities along 
the U.S.-Mexico border argue that the military is an overly expensive and ineffective 
asset and that the military’s funding for these operations should go directly to the law  
enforcement agencies.  The critics point to the example of the overall dismal effects of 
U.S. counternarcotic efforts, and that since the military became involved in the 1980s, the 
figures still remain very disappointing.39  
 
This chapter reevaluates the effectiveness of military support to civilian 
authorities in border control missions.  The first section describes the wide range of 
resources that the military alone is capable of providing to law enforcement agencies and 
argues that without military participation, the effectiveness of border control missions 
would suffer.  The second section refutes the claim made by critics of a military role that 
the military consumes resources that would otherwise be devoted to civilian agencies for 
border control, thus  undermining increased civilian effectiveness.  Finally, the third 
                                          
39  Schnaubelt, Christopher M. (1994), Can the Military’s Effectiveness in the Drug War be Measured? , The Cato 
Journal, Volume 14, Number 2, Fall 1994, p. 1.  
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section shows that military support to civilian authorities on a routine basis is effective in 
providing the framework necessary for a rapid and effective mobilization of forces during 
times of crisis. 
 
A. MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO BORDER CONTROL MISSIONS 
Faced with an epidemic growth of cocaine abuse in the U.S., President Reagan 
implemented National Security Directive Number 221-”Narcotics and National Security” 
which identified illegal narcotics as a threat to the nation’s security and called for military 
support to civilian law enforcement agency’s counter -narcotics operations.  Believing 
that the nation’s law enforcement resources were being overwhelmed by the powerful 
drug cartels, the leadership in Washington felt that the military possessed the advanced 
technology, equipment, and trained, disciplined professionals that could help drug 
enforcement authorities win the “war on drugs.”  The entry of the U.S. Armed Forces into 
the war on drugs ushered in a new era of military support to civil authorities.  America’s 
law enforcement agencies soon began to enjoy the benefits of specialized, highly 
advanced military equipment, previously unavailable to them, in their efforts to fight 
illegal narcotic sale, transportation, and use.  
 
Following the September 11th terrorist attacks, many argued for even an increased 
role for the military in support of civil authorities responsible for U.S. border security.  
Proponents of these measures, like U.S. Representative Tom Tancredo, 6th District 
Colorado, believe that increasing the use of the U.S. armed forces to help federal law 
enforcement agencies secure the international borders is essential for national security.  
When asked whether the military should  be used along the U.S.-Mexico border to support 
civil authorities, he responded by saying, “Absolutely” and that the nation was being 
“invaded” by narcotic traffickers and terrorists.40 
 
Echoing this position U.S. Representative J.D. Hayworth, 6th District, Arizona 
stated that September 11th changed his opinion from being against the military assuming 
                                          
40  Congressman Tom Tancredo, Telephone Interview with Author, Monterey, California, August  27, 2002. 
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MSCA missions along the Mexican border to now believing that it is the “Guard’s role” 
(referring to the National Guard) and “a federal responsibility” to supp ort law 
enforcement agencies during security operations on the U.S.-Mexico border.41  Referring 
to current border security measures as “dangerously inadequate,” Congressman Hayworth 
supports efforts to increase the use of the military to help secure the nat ion’s border. 
 
Advocates of using the military to support civil authority border control efforts 
highlight the unique skills that military personnel possess and the advanced technology 
and equipment that the military has to offer these missions.  For ident ical reasons for the 
military’s support of law enforcement’s counter narcotic operations, many leaders at the 
federal, state, and local level are convinced that the military offers the people and tools to 
greatly strengthen the civil authority’s efforts to secure the nation’s borders.  
Additionally, they argue that every soldier applied in a support role to civil authorities 
can “free up” a law enforcement officer from administrative or auxiliary tasks and engage 
them into a direct “crime-fighting” role.  But by providing personnel to support law 
enforcement agencies, the military is offering much more than just an administrative 
person; it is providing a trained, disciplined specialist that possesses technical and 
analytical skills and abilities that are valuable assets to civil authorities.  Many of these 
assets are difficult and expensive to find outside of military organizations.  Some of the 
military specialties that civil law enforcement agencies have come to rely on include:42 
1. Intelligence Analysts  
Military intelligence analysts support agencies of different sizes.  Many smaller 
agencies operate with very limited budgets, and in some cases have come to rely on a 
single military analyst, provided at no cost to the agency.  Many military analysts can 
comprise of 50% of a small agency’s intelligence staff.43  Military intelligence analysts 
bring analytical abilities, learned through military training and experience that has greatly 
                                          
41  Congressman J. D. Hayworth, Telephone Interview with Author, Monterey, California, September 3, 2002.  
42  Chapter 2-Authorized Missions, National Guard Regulation 500-2/Air National Guard Instruction 10 -801, 31 
March 2000, pp. 8-10. 
43  The Cochise County Sheriff’s Office (Arizona) has a two -person intelligence team (one civilian and one 
military person) provided by the Arizona National Guard Counter Narcotic Task Force.  
20 
enhanced the intelligence gathering and predictive analysis capabilities of  law 
enforcement agencies.  
2. Aviation Support 
The military possesses specialized aircraft and people who can fly and maintain 
them.  Without aviation support, these assets would be available only to police 
departments with large enough budgets to afford sophisticated aircraft of their own.  
Many small to medium sized agencies regularly take advantage of the military aviation 
offered to them during critical operations.  Without the military aviation support, it would 
be nearly impossible for the smaller organizations to incorporate any flying assets into 
their operations. 
3. Ground Sensor Placement/Maintenance  
Ground sensors are electronic devices that detect vibrations and ground 
disturbances that indicate vehicular or foot traffic in an area suspected to be a smuggling 
route and send a radio signal to law enforcement personnel who can respond.  The 
military provides personnel who are trained in proper emplacement techniques and how 
to repair them.   
4. Engineering Support  
Military engineering assets have built/improved border walls and roads for the 
civil authorities that operate along the U.S.-Mexican border.  The military engineer teams 
arrive with equipment, trained personnel, and materials that would otherwise been have 
been nearly financially impossible  for the law enforcement agencies to provide 
themselves.  The engineering projects that are accomplished by the military provide a 
safer work environment for law enforcement officers by restricting the flow of dangerous 




5. Reconnaissance/Observation Support  
Military personnel support law enforcement operations by providing additional 
“eyes and ears” in critical locations on the ground and in the air.  Listening 
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Post/Observation Post (LP/OP) teams use highly specialized night imaging equipment to 
aid police agencies stem the flow of illegal narcotics that are attempting to cross the U.S. 
border form Mexico at night.  In addition to the team’s ability to locate and identify 
possible drug smugglers, they can also warn law enforcement personnel of potential 
danger should the “bad guys” get too close to their positions.  
 
6. Cargo Inspection Support  
Military personnel who support the U.S. Customs Service at the Ports of Entry 
into the United States from Mexico provide cargo inspection support that often uses 
highly specialized and technologically advanced scanning equipment.  The troops 
assigned this mission not only bring special technical skills to the assignment but also, as 
indicated earlier, often their availability to conduct cargo inspections often frees a U.S. 
Customs official to perform more critical law enforcement duties.  
 
B. DO MSCA MISSIONS “ROB” RESOURCES FROM CIVILIAN 
AGENCIES? 
Some opponents of using the military to support law enforcement org anizations 
claim that the money spent on military salaries and equipment for these missions would 
be better utilized if they were given directly to the civilian agencies.  They argue that the 
military essentially becomes a “middle man” that taps into funding that could flow 
directly between the Treasury Department and the supported law enforcement authorities.  
This position is mistaken, however, because it fails to consider the “shared” nature of the 
services offered by the military.  In other words, much of the resources that the military 
supplies to law enforcement agencies are not required on a constant basis and the 
personnel and equipment are frequently scheduled to provide support to different 
agencies at different times.   
 
The funding necessary to provide these military services cannot be effectively 
split between the various supported civilian agencies.  This is because many of the 
resources are shared between many agencies and are not solely committed to one agency.  
For example, how can you divide the resources that provide one soldier that support 
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multiple agencies?  Additionally, many smaller police agencies, particularly in rural 
areas, rely on the support provided to their departments by the military due to their 
diminutive budgets.  If the funds that provide military support to multiple law 
enforcement agencies across the nation were split between these organizations, the 
smaller, usually rural agencies, would actually see far fewer resources than they currently 
enjoy from the armed forces.  This measure would hurt these agencies that have come to 
rely on military support that they ordinarily could never afford.  Finally, to divide the 
counternarcotic budget between the law enforcement agencies would actually mean fewer 
resources would be available to them individually due to the synergistic nature of the 
military’s ability to share resources with multiple agencies.  
 
C. MEASURING MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS IN MSCA OPERATIONS 
Shortly after the military became involved in “America’s War on Drugs” by 
supporting domestic law enforcement agencies, the difficulty of providing reliable 
measurements of effectiveness became clear.  Due to the  “supporting” and not “leading” 
nature of military involvement in counternarcotic operations, it is nearly impossible to 
quantify the contributions that the armed forces offer the civil authorities. 44  Since the 
military is not the “lead agency” for the planning and execution of operations, it is 
possible for the military to perform superbly in a mission that was poorly pla nned and 
executed by the civilian law enforcement organization.  Additionally, since the measure 
of effectiveness for civil authorities is often the amount of narcotics seized, or suspects 
arrested, how can the effectiveness of the armed forces be measured  when it is forbidden 
by law from seizing property and arresting citizens?  Is it possible to measure the 
effectiveness of the military’s support to civil authorities?   
 
Some have argued that military effectiveness in MSCA operations is beast 
measured by “customer satisfaction.”45  This measurement is accomplished through 
                                          
44  Burden, Raymond T., LTC (1991), Measuring the Performance of the Departm ent of Defense in 
Counternarcotic Operations, Study Project, United State Army War College, p. 8.  
45  Schnaubelt, Christopher M. (1994), Can the Military’s Effectiveness in the Drug War be Measured? , The Cato 
Journal, Volume 14, Number 2, Fall 1994, p. 13.  
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customer surveys, and perhaps less formally, through the volume of mission requests that 
are received from the law enforcement community. At the beginning of every fiscal year, 
law enforcement agencies submit their annual requests to the National Guard 
Counterdrug offices and JTF-6 for personnel to support continuing missions throughout 
the year.  Additionally, “pop-up” mission requests are received during the year from 
federal, state and local police authorities for quick, shorter duration operations support.  
The number of mission requests received by the military often out -paces their 
counterdrug resources and have to be declined.46 
 
As further evidence of the effectiveness of the militar y’s support to civil 
authorities, during times when the military is in jeopardy of losing counterdrug funding, 
it is often these law enforcement agencies that campaign the hardest to ensure that the 
money continues to flow to these programs.  The pressure that the law enforcement 
organizations place on congressional leadership to maintain funding for military 
counternarcotics programs is an indicator of how valuable the military’s support to their 
operations have become.  A close look at two case studies on  Military Support to Civil 
Authorities-the L.A. Riots and the post-September 11th security missions -will provide 
ample evidence of the military’s effectiveness in these operations.  Also the case studies 
will highlights obstacles to the effective deployment, like improper planning for military 
support by civil authorities and inappropriate federalization of the National Guard that 
must be overcome to improve military effectiveness.  
 
D. CASE STUDIES OF MSCA: EVIDENCE OF EFFECTIVENESS  
During two emergencies , one state and one federal, the military was called in to 
help civilian authorities restore order during intense rioting and civil unrest in Los 
Angeles, and to provide additional security following the terrorist attacks on the United 
States on September 11th 2001.  In both cases, the military was credited for the 
successfully supporting law enforcement agencies during times of extreme crisis.  The 
military was able to quickly respond with much needed organization, manpower, and 
                                          
46  Based on the author’s experience as a counternarcotics operation officer for the Arizona National Guard.  
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equipment that greatly improved the civil authorities effectiveness.  I will first look at the 
effectiveness of military support to the civilian agencies during the L.A. Riots in 1992, 
and parallel how the military effectiveness in this episode can be applied to MSCA 
mission on the U.S.-Mexico border, then I will examine how the armed forces aided 
federal authorities with emergency security operations after the attacks on September 11 th 
2001. 
1. The Los Angeles Riots  
Within hours of the April 29th, 1992 acquittal of white police officers that had 
been charged with the beating of a black man riots broke out in Los Angeles.  
Widespread violence and arson quickly grew beyond civilian law enforcement 
organization’s capacity to control them.  By 9:00 PM that evening, at the request of L.A. 
Mayor Tom Bradley, the California Governor Pete Wilson called 2000 National Guard 
troops to state active duty to aid L.A. County and city police officials restore order. 47  By 
8:00 PM on April 30th, (the second day of the rioting) the California National Guard had 
1000 troops supporting the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and the Los Angeles 
County Sheriff’s Department (LASD), with an additional 1000 standing by in local 
armories waiting law enforcement requests for their support.48  At the end of this  day 
however, the LAPD and LASD requested an additional 2000 troops.49   
 
Overcoming the confusion created by the poor emergency planning and 
conflicting messages from the civil leadership in Los Angeles, 50 the California National 
Guard was able to quickly respond to the Governor’s call-up.51  California National 
Guard personnel began appearing on the streets of Los Angeles at 2:35 PM on the second 
                                          
47  Schnaubelt, Christopher M. (1997), Lessons in Command and Control from the Los Angeles Riots , Parameters, 
Summer 1997, p. 104. 
48  Schnaubelt, Christopher M. (1997), p. 104. 
49  Schnaubelt, Christopher M. (1997), p. 104. 
50  Delk, James D. (1995), Fires and Furies: The LA Riots (Palm Springs, Calif.: ETC Publications), p. 45.  
51  Harrison, William H. (1992), Assessment of the Performance of the California National Guard During the 
Civil Disturbances in Los Angeles , April & May 1992, Report to the Honorable Pete Wilson, Governor, State of 
California, 2 October 1992, p. 6.  Cited from: Schnaubelt, Christopher M. (1997), Lessons in Command and Control 
from the Los Angeles Riots, Parameters, Summer 1997, p. 108. 
25 
day of the riot.52  The deployment of the troops was greatly aided by the California 
National Guard counterdrug organization that had great experience in coordinating 
military support to civilian law enforcement missions.53 The arrival of the National 
Guard had a significant impact in restoring order to Los Angeles.54  Civil authorities 
came to view the military not only as a free security force, but also “…as the only power 
on the scene that everyone trusted.”55   
 
An example of the effectiveness of the National Guard’s support to law 
enforcement agencies was demonstrated on the third day of the riot.  On this day in Lon g 
Beach, rioters had set up barricades to keep the police and firefighters out of their 
neighborhood and began looting at will, ignoring police demands to disperse.  When the 
HUMVEE’s of the 270th Military Police Company arrived the disturbances stopped 
instantly, and the streets cleared.56  Further evidence of the National Guard’s 
effectiveness was found in the survey conducted a few months after the riots.  One of the 
53 questions asked of Los Angeles residents was: “Which do you think were the two  
 
 
most effective public safety agencies in handling the LA riots?”  A majority of the people 
polled (66%) indicated that they felt that the National Guard had been the most effective 
agency in handling the L.A. riots.57 
 
                                          
52  Schnaubelt, Christopher M. (1997), p. 104. 
53  Schnaubelt, Christopher M. (1997), p. 112. 
54  Webster, William H. and Williams, Hubert, The City in Crisis-A report by the Special Advisor to the Board of 
Police Commissioners on the Civil Disorders in Los Angeles, October 21, 1992, p. 151.  
55  Quote, FM JTF/LA to CDR FORSCOM, 051300Z May 92, sub: 7th ID, SITREP #6, p. 2. In JFT SitRep 
Folder, LA Riot File, CMH.  Referenced in Scheips, Paul J., The Role of Federal Military Forces in Civil Disturbances, 
1945-1971, U.S. Army Center of Military History, p. 94.  
56  Delk, James D.  (1995), Fires and Furies: The LA Riots (Palm Springs, Calif.: ETC Publications), p. 109.  
57  Webster, William H. and Williams, Hubert, The City in Crisis-APPENDICES-A report by the Special Advisor 
to the Board of Police Commissioners on the Civil Disorders in Los Angeles, October 21, 1992, p. 16.  
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On May 1st, federal forces began to arrive in L.A. and created Joint Task Force 
Los Angeles (JTFLA), set up a headquarters, and federalized the California National 
Guard troops that were on the scene in L.A. 58  By this time however, the efforts of “more 
than 4000 CANG troops, 5000 LAPD officers, and about 4000 additional police officers 
from around the state” had essentially ended the riots.59   
 
The ability for the military (especially the California National Guard in this case) 
to mobilize so quickly, and to provide trained, well disciplined men an d women ready to 
support civil authorities, even under some of the most dangerous conditions, 
demonstrates the effectiveness that the military can also offer law enforcement agencies 
along the U.S.-Mexico border during times of national crisis.  The follow ing case looks 
into such a crisis. 
 
2. The Border Security Missions Post September 11 th 2001 
Following the terrorist attacks on September 11 th 2001, the National Guard from 
every state and territory were asked to deploy to airports and Ports of Entry to provide 
additional support for the civil authorities that were struggling with new security 
requirements.  The National Guard quickly responded and fulfilled the security role until 
federal authorities could bolster their own ranks and relieve the Guard.  As  the military 
had been “important psychologically to the restoration of order”60 during the L.A. Riots, 
many believed that the presence of highly visible service members in airport terminals 
and ports of entry would restore the confidence of American travelers still shaken by the 
September 11th attacks, and also aid U.S. Customs officials at the Ports of Entry.  
 
The post-September 11th security missions demonstrated that the National Guard 
possessed an ability to respond almost instantly to civil emergency s ituations.  On Friday, 
November 2nd 1991, Jane Hull, Governor of Arizona, announced that she planned on 
                                          
58  Schnaubelt, Christopher M. (1997), p. 112. 
59  Schnaubelt, Christopher M. (1997), p. 112. 
60  Cannon, Lou (1997), Official Negligence-How Rodney King and the Riots Changed Los Angeles and the 
LAPD, Random House, p. 345. 
27 
sending the National Guard to Arizona’s six Ports of Entry to help U.S. Customs officials 
who were overwhelmed by the volume of traffic coming from Mexico with the new 
security measures in place.  According to the governor, these Guard personnel were to be 
“on station” by November 6th, only four days after her public announcement.  This 
represented a challenge in two ways: there was very little time for t he National Guard to 
respond to the governor’s order, and most of the planning and execution had to occur 
over a weekend.61  Despite these challenges, the Arizona National Guard had the required 
number of troops at the Ports of Entry on the day requested by  the governor.62  The 
deployment of the troops was greatly aided by the Arizona National Guard counterdrug 
organization that had already established a professional working relationship with many 
of the civilian law enforcement agencies that the Guard would be supporting.63 
 
E.  CASE STUDIES OF MSCA: OBSTACLES TO EF FECTIVENESS  
Despite the military’s success in restoring order during the L.A. riots and 
providing additional border and airport security after the September 11 th terrorist attacks 
on the United States, there were a number of obstacles to military effectiveness that 
inhibited the speed of the deployment and limited the support that was available to law 
enforcement officials.  In the case of the L.A. riots, one of the obstacles was the Lack of 
prior planning between civil and military leaders that hampered the speed and efficiency 
of the California National Guard’s reaction to the governor’s call for mobilization.  But in 
both the L.A. riots and the post September 11 th security cases, the hasty federalization of 
the National Guard unnecessarily introduced Posse Comitatus restrictions that limited the 
operations that were less restricted while under the state’s control.  
 
The civil leaders in Los Angeles never predicted the sudden, explosive public 
reaction to the verdict from the Rodney King beating trial or the enormity of the violence 
and destruction of the L.A. riots.  All emergency plans that involved the National Guard 
                                          
61  This section is based on the author’s experience as Operations Officer responsible for executing this mission.  
62  Rotstein, Arthur H. (2001), National Guard Arrives at Border to Help Customs Speed Up Traffic, The 
Associated Press State & Local Wire, November 6, 2001.  
63  Schnaubelt, Christopher M. (1997), p. 112. 
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were of natural emergency nature, like earthquakes, city authorities believed that  law 
enforcement officials could handle any civil disturbances without help from the 
military.64  In fact shortly after the riots had begun, the California Office of Emergency 
Services (OES), the agency responsible for coordinating statewide emergency respo nses, 
told the National Guard that “on-the-street” support would not be required from the 
Guard.65  At this point, the National Guard began to loan out thousands of protective 
masks, Kevlar helmets, and flak vests to the LAPD and local fire departments. 66  When 
the governor activated the National Guard it was forced to pull back the equipment that it 
had earlier loaned out.  This delay cost the Guard precious mobilization time.  
 
Despite the superb efforts of the California National Guard in its mobilization of 
so many troops, so quickly, some civil authorities complained that the Guard was moving 
too slowly and began to demand federal troops.67  This was an unfortunate byproduct of 
the failure to incorporate the National Guard into L.A.’s emergency plans and th e lack of 
a clear understanding by some civilian leaders of National Guard mobilization 
procedures.68  Again, Mayor Tom Bradley asked Governor Pete Wilson to send in the 
military, only this time he requested federal troops.69  It is important to note that the 
Mayor’s request for federal troops did not come “at the prodding by local law 
enforcement officials, but through the influence of former Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher, who was a well-connected private citizen at the time.”70  Apparently 
surrendering “to politics and the images on national TV screens”, Governor Pete Wilson, 
agreed to ask the President for federal help.71  Yet even as the governor’s office phoned 
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68  Schnaubelt, Christopher M. (1997), p. 108. 
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70  Schnaubelt, Christopher M. (1997), p. 112. 
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Washington for additional troops, approximately 1000 California National Guard troops 
were waiting in armories for civilian requests for support.72 
 
When the active Army and Marine units and leadership arrived in Los Angeles, 
they immediately federalized the National Guard troops on the ground there and began 
the creation of new command and control relationships between themselves and the 
civilian authorities.  The federalization of the National Guard during the L.A. riots had an 
unexpectedly negative impact on the amount of support provided to the civil authorities 
once the active military took control.  Before federalization, nearly 100% of all law 
enforcement mission requests sent to the California National Guard were approved and 
executed.  After federalization, only approximately 20% of the mission requests were 
approved.73  Changes in the procedures for mission request review and approval and the 
impact of Posse Comitatus restrictions dramatically reduced the missions that the 
military, now under federal control, was capable of supporting.  
 
Although the military, both California National Guar d and U.S. Army and Marine 
Corps, were credited with helping civilian law enforcement agencies restore order and 
end the rioting in Los Angeles, poor or absent planning and the hasty federalization of the 
National Guard troops limited the effectiveness of the military’s support to civil 
authorities.   
 
Shortly following the deployment of the National Guard to the U.S. Border in 
response to post September 11 th security demands, debates began in Washington over the 
status of the state troops at the border.  Many argued that since the border is a federal 
responsibility, the National Guard should be under federal (USC Title 10) authority, and 
not the authority of the governors of their states.  Despite the protests of many of the 
governors, the border security mission became federalized and the National Guard 
personnel now reported to a U.S. Army command set -up to assume the mission.   
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30 
 
The belief that the Guard personnel must become “federalized” to support federal 
law enforcement agents along the border was mis taken, however.  Since the early 1990’s, 
National Guard personnel had been performing counterdrug duties in support of U.S. 
Customs and Border Patrol on the U.S. border under USC Title 32 authority.  In this 
capacity, they remained under the control of the governors of their states while still 
supporting federal law enforcement agencies.  Therefore there was no legal reason to 
federalize the Guard personnel that were performing the security duties.  Additionally, 
once federalized, the National Guard troops were sent to a “mobilization station” and 
when through six-weeks of in processing.  The time spend in the federal mobilization 
process was extremely long and expensive when measured against what the states were 
able to accomplish in much less time.  For example, when the Arizona National Guard 
personnel became federalized, they were sent to Fort Bliss, Texas for in processing that 
took several weeks.  Conversely, when they were originally activated on state orders, the 
process took less than two days, and that was accomplished in their own communities.74  







This chapter highlighted examples of the effectiveness of the military’s support to 
civil authorities.  Due to the military’s unique mission of defending the nation, it 
possesses exceptionally well trained and disciplines personnel and highly advanced 
technology and equipment.  All this coupled with the military’s ability to deploy these 
resources very quickly enables the armed forces to provide highly effective support to 
civil authorities in day-to-day operations, like counterdrug missions, and also respond to                                           
74  Based on the author’s experience as Operations Officer for the Arizona National Guard Joint Counter Narcotic 
Task Force (JCNTF) responsible for executing these missions.  
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requests for emergency aid, like in the cases of civil disturbances and other national 
crises.  
 
A great deal of the assets that the military offers to law enforcement agencies is 
unavailable anywhere else.  By sharing these resources with agencies of all sizes, the 
military provides services that otherwise would be impossible for small, rural police 
departments to access due to their small budgets.  For all agencies of any size, the 
availability of trained military personnel enables them to shift law enforcement officers 
from auxiliary/administrative duties to “crime fighting” activities.  
 
These lessons learned from the deployments to the L.A. riots and the post 
September 11th border security operations have application to improve the military’s 
effectiveness in future MSCA missions.  For example , to increase the effectiveness and 
speed up the deployment of the military’s support to law enforcement agencies, detailed 
discussions and planning must be conducted to ensure the proper coordination is made 
between civil leaders and the National Guard in the case of an emergency.  Civil-Military 
contingency plans must include realistic timetables for National Guard responses. This 
measure will reduce the likelihood of misunderstandings of the procedures for a National 
Guard emergency call up. 
 
Another improvement to effectiveness can be found by avoidin g the hasty 
federalization of the National Guard.  Before National Guard troops are federalized, a 
clear understanding of the limitations that Posse Comitatus places on the amount and 
types of support missions that federal forces the can offer law enforcem ent agencies must 
be clearly understood.  Because of the nature of military support to civil authorities in 
crisis situations like the Los Angeles riots, federalization may actually reduce the 
effectiveness of the military’s support efforts and should be avoided.  Also, by keeping 
Guard troops under local control, mobilization processes can be conducted much quicker 
and less expensively than transporting personnel to a federal mobilization site (two states 
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away as in the federalization of Arizona Guard personnel during the post September 11th 
border security mission).  
 
33 
IV. THE IMPACT ON HUMAN AND CIVIL RIGHTS 
To many people, using the armed forces to support law enforcement agencies 
along the southwest border region is a poor domestic policy and the beginnin g of a very 
dangerous trend toward the “militarization” of the U.S. -Mexico border.  The opponents 
of placing the military on the U.S. -Mexico border claim that the “militarization” of the 
border will result in human and civil rights violations at the hands of the military.  They 
argue that border control missions are more appropriate for trained civilian law 
enforcement agents who are oriented toward arrests and civil rights, then the military, 
which is geared toward destroying enemies.  The accidental killing of an eighteen-year-
old American citizen near the border town of Redford, Texas by a team of U.S. Marines 
conducting a counter-narcotic patrol for the U.S. Border Patrol in 1997, confirmed the 
fears of the opponents of militarization of the Mexican bord er. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the nature of these concerns and how 
civil and military leaders can best address them.  It does so by answering a series of 
questions:  Are soldiers prone to violating the human and civil rights of U.S. citize ns and 
foreign nationals while conducting civil authority support missions?  To what extent do 
the longstanding Posse Comitatus laws help guard against the violation of human and 
civil rights by the military?  Can specialized training for military service members bridge 
the gap between the “vaporize” mentality and the “Mirandize” mentality?  
 
This chapter evaluates the ability of the military to support civil authorities 
without violating human or civil rights.  The first section looks at examples of human and 
civil rights violations by the military while supporting law enforcement agencies.  The 
second section examines the legal framework that not only authorizes military support to 
civil authorities, but also the restrictions placed on the military that pr ohibit human and 
civil rights violations.  The third section discusses the additional measures that the 
military has taken to prevent such violations.  Finally, the last section highlights actual 
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cases where the military’s support to civilian authorities have many times saved lives and 
protected the human and civil rights of illegal immigrants and narcotic smugglers.  
 
A. CONCERNS OVER MILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITY: 
THE REDFORD INCIDENT 
Since the Department of Defense began providing military personnel to support 
domestic law enforcement counternarcotic operations, many critics expressed concern 
over the appropriateness of applying the military in an environment that required the 
restraint of physical force and application of legal rules and procedures.   Critics argue 
that as law enforcement officers are trained in a “Mirandize” culture, the military comes 
from a “vaporize” culture that makes it unsuitable for this mission.  According to 
opponents of using the armed forces for law enforcement support ope rations, military 
personnel lack the training and experience to be effective in this environment without 
violating the human or civil rights of U.S. or foreign citizens.   
 
An incident involving a team of Marines and the death a U.S. citizen outside of 
the rural border town of Redford, Texas, confirmed the fears of many who argued that 
military participation in civilian law enforcement missions would result in violations of 
human and civil rights.  The “Redford Incident” dramatically demonstrated that the 
human and civil right of civilians could be in jeopardy when the armed forces are used in 
domestic law enforcement operations.  What happened at Redford, Texas and does the 
incident prove the military’s unsuitability for civil authority support missions? 
 
In May of 1997, a four-member U.S. Marine Corps team was supporting (through 
Joint Task Force-6) a U.S. Border Patrol counter narcotic operation along the border near 
Redford, Texas.  The team was conducting a listening post/observation post mission that 
involves occupying a concealed, static position (although some patrolling may be 
involved) that offers the team the ability to see and hear possible drug smugglers crossing 
the border from Mexico.  By law, military personnel involved in domestic law 
enforcement are not allowed to search, seize, arrest or confront a suspect.  Military 
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involvement is strictly limited to activities such as surveillance and intelligence (10 
USCA Sec. 375).  Soldiers are allowed to return fire in self-defense. 
 
During the mission, the Marines spotted a local 18 year -old goat herder named 
Esequiel Hernandez.  Believing that Hernandez was a drug smuggler, or a smuggler’s 
scout, the team kept him under observation.  According to team leader Corporal Manuel 
Banuelos, Hernandez fired tw o shots at them from a .22 caliber rifle.  Under the rules of 
engagement that were a part of the team’s pre-mission briefing, they were authorized to 
use deadly force to protect themselves or the life of another.   
 
After receiving fire from Hernandez, Cor poral Banuelos made radio contact with 
his headquarters (70 miles away in Marfa, Texas) to report the incident and receive 
guidance.  Initially, he was instructed to shoot Hernandez if he raised his rifle again to 
fire, but a later transmission told him to “follow the R.O.E.” (Rules of Engagement).75  
However, inconsistent with the rules of engagement with regards to following suspects 
only in defense or recovery of personnel, the Marine “fanned out” and paralleled 
Hernandez for 20 minutes.76  At this point, according to the Marines, Hernandez raised 
his rifle to shoot again at the team and was shot by Corporal Banuelos.  
 
Despite having a trained medic on the team, the Marines provided no first aid to 
Hernandez (the autopsy found that he had bled to death).  Approximately 10 minutes 
after Hernandez was shot, the U.S. Border Patrol arrived and took control of the scene.  
Due to miscommunications between the Marines and the Border Patrol (each thought that 
the other had requested medical-evacuation (Med-Evac)), 18 minutes elapsed after 
Hernandez was shot before medical assistance was requested.  By the time Med -Evac 
arrived, Esequiel Hernandez was dead.  
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36 
 
Based on the findings from their investigation, military officials called the 
shooting a tragic incident, and that all indications were that the Marines had been 
operating inside of their rules of engagement.77  Two grand jury investigations followed 
the shooting, - one federal and one state – neither jury decided to indict Corporal 
Banuelos or any of the Marines on the team.78  The Hernandez family, the community of 
Redford, and many human rights groups were outraged by these findings and the alleged 
lack of cooperation that the Department of Defense offered during the civil investigation.   
 
The Redford Incident has confirmed the worst fears of those who opposed the 
militarization of the U.S.-Mexico border and has become the cornerstone of the 
arguments against using the military for civil authority support missions.  Opponents 
claim that the military’s primary mission of fighting wars makes it incompatible with 
civil law enforcement operations that are concerned with legalities and the protection of 
civil rights.  Can the military conduct law enforcement support missions without 
becoming a serious threat to human and civil rights?  How can future “Redford Incidents” 
be prevented? 
 
B. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR MILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVIL 
AUTHORITIES  
When a government wishes to deprive its citizens of freedom, and reduce 
them to slavery, it generally makes use of a standin g army.  Luther Martin, 
Maryland Constitutional Convention Delegate, 1787  
Since the early colonial days, Americans with the memories fresh in their minds 
of British military occupation and enforcement of law, feared the possible tyranny from a 
strong standing army.  Concerned that a large standing army would become “dangerous 
to the liberties of a country” the new government took measures to limit the size and 
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strength of the army.79  Shortly following the end of the American War for 
Independence, the Continental Army was reduced to “80 artillerymen retained to guard 
military stores at West Point and Fort Pitt.” [and] “…a new force of 700 men, a regiment 
of eight infantry and two artillery companies, which was to become the nucleus of a new 
Regular Army.”80  The tendency to dramatically cut the size of the American Army 
immediately following wars to ensure that it did not interfere with the freedoms of U.S. 
citizens was to continue until the end of World War Two.  However, during the 
Reconstruction Period that followed the American Civil War, a problem was encountered 
in the southern states when the occupying U.S. Army became involved in the 
enforcement of civil law.  
 
Following the Civil War, the U.S. Congress divided the former Confederate States 
in five military districts and placed a Major General at the head of each of these districts.  
The Army was used extensively to restore order and enforce law in the South during this 
period.  Quelling riots and civil disturbances, administering oaths of allegiance, an d 
aiding law enforcement officials were a few of the duties that the Army became involved 
in.  Southerners soon became outraged by the military occupation and its use for civil law 
enforcement.  As a result, Congress enacted the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878  that placed 
strict limits on the military’s participation in civilian law enforcement duties.81  The act 
states that: 
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized 
by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of t he Army 
or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or 
both.82 
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Additional restrictions to the use of the armed forces for law enforcement 
authority support are outlined in Title 10 of the U.S. Code: 
The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe such regulations necessary to 
ensure that any activity (including the provision of any equipment or 
facility or the assignment or detail of any personnel) under this chapter 
does not include or permit direct participation by a member of the Army, 
Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in a search, seizure, arrest, or other 
similar activity unless participation in such activity by such member is 
otherwise authorized by law.83 
Despite the protections offered by these longstanding protections, a U.S. citizen 
was still killed by U.S. troops that were engaged in domestic law enforcement support 
operations.  The “Redford Incident” has become the battle cry for individuals and 
organizations that are opposed to using the military to support civil authorities along the 
U.S.-Mexico border.  What further steps to protect human and civil rights has the military 
taken?  How effective has the military been in preventing another “Redford Incident?”  
 
It should be noted that the National Guard faced similar condemnation over the 
fatal shooting of four students and the wounding of eight others during anti-Vietnam War 
protests on the campus of Kent State Ohio on May 4, 1970.  Following the government’s 
announcement that U.S. combat forces would be sent into Cambodia, anti-war 
demonstrations began on Kent State’s campus.84  The protest soon “spilled into the city 
of Kent's downtown” resulting in vandalism and damage to a number of businesses and 
eventually the mobilization of the Ohio National Guard.85  The National Guard troops 
arrived on Saturday, May 2nd, but the disorder continued into the evening marked by the 
burning of the campus headquarters of the Army Reserve Officers' Training Corps 
(ROTC).86  Calm settled on Kent State’s campus on Sunday, but at noon the following 
day, an estimated 2,000 to 3,000 people began another anti-war rally.87  The National 
Guard soon arrived and attempted to disperse the crowd, but instead of clear the area, the 
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crowd responded with “verbal epithets and stones.”88  Shortly after an unsuccessful 
attempt to break-up the demonstration with tear gas, the National Guard opened fire on 
the students with their rifles.89  After 13 seconds of rifle fire by 28 Guardsmen four 
students were dead, eight more were wounded, and one person permanently paralyzed.90  
 
After the smoke had cleared from the campus, what was to become known as the 
“Kent State Massacre” shocked much of America.  Even those who detested the politics 
of the rioters could not condone the actions of the National Guard.  Public outrage was 
followed by governmental action.  Federal and state grand juries conveyed to investigate 
the Kent State shootings.  Although no Guardsmen were indicted by the grand juries, the 
training and equipment that the National Guard had received for civil disturbance 
operations were criticized.91  In fact, the Federal grand jury found that the Guardsmen 
had “inappropriate weapons” for ending campus riots and that they had been placed in an 
“untenable and dangerous position.”92 
 
The National Guard leadership at the federal level began to make changes in the 
training and the equipment that the Guardsmen would receive for civil disorder 
operations.  At this point, the National Guard began to consider “civil disturbances as a 
critical mission, rather than a state or local distraction.”93  It has become an annual 
training requirement that all National Guard personnel receive civil disturbance training.  
Since changing the training, equipment and tactics that the National Guard uses for civil 
disorder, it has been deployed to many domestic crises without instances of human rights 
violations.  This fact speaks well for the National Guard when as an example, one 
considers that thousands of Guard personnel were deployed for days to the L.A. riots, the 
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most violent riots in the city’s history, with no episodes of excessive use of force. 94  It 
also appears that the National Guard has improved its abilities in civil-military 
cooperation.  Due to the National Guard’s community-based nature, and with many 
federal, state and local law enforcement officers in its ranks, the Guard is now more 
capable of coordinating its efforts with those of law enforcement.  
 
C. DEPARTMENT OF DEF ENSE AND NATIONAL GUARD POLICIES 
AND TRAINING TO PREVENT HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
Slightly over a year after Esequiel Hernandez’ death, Major General John T. 
Coyne (USMC) released the results of his investigation of the shooting.  In a 1300 page 
report, General Coyne concluded that the mission that ended in Hernandez’ shooting was 
full of “systematic failures at every level of command.”95  “It was a mission fraught with 
errors, communication breakdowns and questionable judgments, led by a team leader 
who seemed oddly eager to pull the trigger of his M-16.”96 
 
But the Department of Defense (DoD) did not wait for the release of General 
Coyne’s report before it took measures to prevent another “Redford incident”.  On July 
29,1997, DoD officials ordered an end to armed missions in MSCA missions and was 
even considering whether or not to pull all troops out of domestic counter -narcotic 
missions.97  But the DoD did not end the military’s involvement with counterdrug law 
enforcement support missions.  After reviewing General Coyne’s report of the shooting, 
DoD officials determined that specialized training for the soldiers that were conducting 
these types of missions could help prevent another “Redford Incident.”  According to Air 
Force Colonel Henry Hungerbeeler, chief of staff of Joint Task Force-6, the improved 
training is “primarily aimed at the proportional use of force, trying to clarify that 
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although deadly force might be authorized, it might not be necessary…”98  He went on to 
say that, “The last thing we want to do is have the American people afraid of us…”99 
 
The National Guard counterdrug programs, which are operated at the state level 
under the governor’s command, also took steps to avoid another “Redford Incident” by 
reviewing the policies and procedures that involved the arming of National Guard 
personnel supporting civil authorities on counter -narcotic missions.  Additional training 
was mandated for personnel involved in missions that required the carrying of firearms 
for self-defense.  This includes “force continuum” training begins with defensive team 
extraction from the area, and then shifts to verbal commands (in Spanish and English) if 
extraction is not possible.  Only when all non-lethal means of defense are exhausted will 
the team resort to the use of deadly force.  The Arizona National Guard Joint Cou nter 
Narcotic Task Force went so far as to permanently end armed patrolling missions and did 
not return to arming their static LP/OP teams until 2001, almost four years after Esequiel 
Hernandez’ death.100  
 
The California National Guard Counter-Drug Task Force took similar steps 
following the Redford shooting.  According to the Secretary of Defense’s directive 
following the Redford shooting, the California National Guard ceased conducting armed 
law enforcement support missions along the U.S. -Mexico border.  After a few years of 
reviewing their policies and procedures, the California National Guard resumed armed 
operations.  But the armed missions were resumed along the border only after improving 
the training that the personnel conducting these missions receiv ed.101 
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Although the New Mexico National Guard stopped providing armed personnel to 
support Border Patrol missions after the Redford shooting, it did continue to support 
armed missions for other federal, state and local law enforcement agencies.102  But 
according to the New Mexico National Guard’s Counter-Drug Coordinator, Lieutenant 
Colonel Andrew Salas, his task force “ratcheted down the armed missions” by more 
closely scrutinizing the mission requests from the law enforcement agencies and reducing 
the number of missions that required that the troops carry weapons.103  Additionally, his 
task force began to use the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) firearms 
and rules of engagement training.104   
 
To help the various states’ counter -drug task forces train the personnel who are 
involved in law enforcement support missions that require the carrying of firearms, the 
National Interagency Counterdrug Institute (NICI) began conducting advanced firearm 
training.  This course and annual refresher training is now mandatory for National Guard 
personnel who participate in armed law enforcement support operations.  According to 
NICI’s website, the five-day program (that receives financial support from the National 
Guard Bureau) focuses on:  
Skills and techniques for executing armed LP/OP (5A) missions in both 
rural and urban settings Risk and vulnerability assessments Safety and 
medical procedures Rules of engagement and use of force Lessons learned 
It describes the program in the following fashion: 
This course is taught by experienced military and law enforcement 
personnel who have planned, coordinated and executed Mission 5A.  
Instructors are also from offices that provide medical, logistical, 
communication, and legal support to these operations.  Attendees discuss 
rules of engagement and use of force in both rural and urban settings.  
Instructors emphasize procedures utilized for identifying locations, 
conducting risk and vulnerability assessments and contingency planning.  
Attendees are given techniques for ensurin g effective communication and 
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coordination between the military and the supported law enforcement 
organizations.  At the conclusion of the course, students participate in an 
interactive scenario-based training exercise that tests the participant’s 
ability to safely and effectively execute Mission 5A. 105 
National Guard personnel now receive firearm training that is identical, or similar, 
to that received by the law enforcement officers that they support in the field and 
therefore it becomes far less likely that another mistake like the one that took Esequiel 
Hernandez’ life can happen again.   
 
D. MILITARY EFFORTS TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 
When evaluating the impact on human and civil rights by the military while 
supporting civilian authorities along the U.S.-Mexico border, the protection of these 
rights offered by the military is often overlooked.  Perhaps the greatest unexplored, 
unpublished byproduct of the MSCA operations along the southwest border is the 
humanitarian efforts that occur during the course of these missions.  Widely published are 
reports of illegal alien deaths in the hot, arid deserts that border Mexico, but largely (due 
to the sensitive nature of some of these missions) unreported, are the lives saved by 
military personnel on the ground and in the air who provide water, medical assistance, 
and radio for, or conduct themselves, medical evacuation for those who have become 
stranded or seriously injured while crossing the dangerous terrain.  In fact it has become 
Standing Operational Procedures (SOP) in many task forces that vehicles and aircraft that 
are operating in the deserts along the U.S.-Mexico border carry an extra water supply 
solely for humanitarian purposes should the military teams locate people who are in 
danger of dehydration.106 
 
Although humanitarian assistance is not the primary mission of the military in 
operations on the U.S. -Mexico border, they have become a part of these activities.  In 
fact, the military has been credited for saving many lives and protecting people from 
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harm.  The following examples highlight the military’s ability to provide aid and comfort 
to those in need, in places where help is otherwise unavailable.  
 
Early in 2000, a listening post/observation post (LP/OP) team spotted a female 
accompanied by a young boy, staggering, almost in an intoxicated fashion, in a remote 
area of the Arizona desert near the U.S. -Mexican border.  When the team approached the 
pair, they found a woman in her late twenties and her five-year-old son.  Her staggering 
was not caused by drunkenness, but by the fact that she was a diabetic and was going into 
shock.  Being unable to keep up with a group of Mexicans that were being smuggled into 
the United States, the coyote 107 leading them through the desert insisted on leaving them 
behind.  The LP/OP team provided food and water to the pair, who was terribly 
dehydrated, and radioed in life-saving medical evacuation.  Both were taken to a nearby 
hospital were they were provided medical care. 108  
 
Later in the same year, another LP/OP team noticed two people hiding behind 
some desert brush.  Noting that the couple appeared to be in distress, the team vectored 
help to the position where the two were located.  When help arrived, they found a young, 
married Mexican couple that had been apprehended by a squad of Mexican soldiers just 
before crossing into the United States.  During their ordeal with the Mexican squad, the 
soldiers had sexually assaulted the woman and seriously injured the male.  While his wife 
was being assaulted, the husband was instructed by the soldiers to shine a flashlight on 
her.  When at one point he dropped the flashlight, his arm was broken by a blow from a 
Mexican soldier’s rifle.  When the LP/OP team sighted the couple, the pair was quite 
naturally in a great deal of dis tress.  The couple was taken to a local hospital where they 
both received medical treatment.109 
 
                                          
107   Slang term for people who smuggle aliens into the United States illegally.  
108  LP/OP team members from this operation, Telephone Interview with Author, Monterey, California, 27 
September 2002.  
109  LP/OP team members from this operation Telephone Interview with Author, Monterey, California, 27 
September 2002. 
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Relief to those who have become dangerously lost or stranded in the desert can 
also come from military aviation.  Frequently, helicopter pilots spot fires that have been 
lit by illegal aliens who have been abandoned by their coyotes and have ran out of water.  
In one such case, when the pilot set down his helicopter to help a Mexican migrant who 
had been without water for days, the man was so badly dehydrated that  when rescued, his 
eyes could produce no tears as he cried.110 
 
Humanitarian assistance is sometimes given to the least expected persons in the 
least expected situations.  During a counterdrug operation in 2000, law enforcement 
personnel operating with milit ary aircraft support near the U.S.-Mexico border had 
surprised narcotic smugglers.  As the smugglers attempted to run back across the border 
in very steep and rocky terrain, one of them fell and received a compound fracture to his 
leg.  Still on U.S. soil,  with his femur protruding from his thigh, bleeding profusely from  
his wound, and miles from the nearest hospital, the narcotic smuggler would have bled to 
death if not for military aviation.  The man was taken aboard the helicopter and flown to 
a treatment facility that saved his live. 111 
 
E.  CONCLUSION 
Despite the possible terrorist threats coming from the southwest border of the 
United States, opponents of using the military in a law enforcement capacity voice grave 
concerns over possible human and civil rights violations at hands of soldiers.  They argue 
that military personnel lack the temperament and training to restrain themselves from 
using unnecessary force.  The shooting of 18 -year-old Esequiel Hernandez near Redford , 
Texas, in 1997 provides these critics with evidence that their fears are not unfounded.  
What is missing from their argument is the fact that however tragic the “Redford 
incident” was, it was one isolated occurrence among hundreds of other armed missions 
that produce no human or civil rights violations and have even provided aid and comfort 
to illegal immigrants and narcotics smugglers that have come into peril in the desert.  
                                          
110  Helicopter pilot from this mission, Telephone Interview with Author, Monterey, California, 27 September 
2002 and 25 September 2002. 
111  Helicopter pilot from this mission, Telephone Interview with Author, Monterey, California, 27 September 
2002 and 25 September 2002. 
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More importantly, is the military has investigated the causes of the Redford shooting and 
has corrected the deficiencies that caused the incident by improving the training that 
military personnel receive before engaging in missions where deadly force may be used.  
By receiving advanced rules of engagement and escalation of force training, military 
personnel become more capable of successfully conducting armed support missions that 
do not harm, and even protect the human and civil rights of both U.S. and foreign 
citizens.   
 
Additionally, the civil disturbance training that became a mandatory part for every 
National Guard troop following the Kent State shootings has proven to be effective when 
the National Guard has been called in to support law enforcement authorities.  This has 
been demonstrated during numerous civil disturbances, counterdrug operations, and 
border and airport security missions that National Guard personnel have been engaged in.  
The civil support training and the “community-based” nature of the National Guard 















V. U.S. BORDER LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT MISSIONS-
THE LOSS OF READINESS AND CREDIBILITY?  
Some critics of military support of civil authority (MSCA) operations like border 
security missions, claim that when soldiers shift their focus from training for war to non-
military, civil-support roles that they degrade or lose their combat skills.  They argue that 
the loss of these “warfighter” skills weakens America’s readiness for war and place 
additional pressures on military units to correct training deficiencies dur ing limited 
training cycles.  Proponents of the use of the military for these missions claim that 
combat skills are not lost and that law enforcement support missions can actually 
improve readiness.   
 
But even some supporters of these missions are concerned with the political 
backlash that can come from citizen groups opposed to the military’s involvement in 
some types of law enforcement support roles.  They argue that when the military assumes 
missions that are not popular with some civilians or politicia ns, that the military’s 
credibility can be damaged.  The loss of credibility with the public (and legislators) due 
to participation in politically unpopular missions could spell the loss of operational funds, 
the use of training areas, and support for other military programs through legislative 
action and/or public protest.  For example, the U.S. Navy is still feeling the effects of 
civilian outrage over the accidental killing of a Puerto Rican security guard by an errant 
bomb on the Puerto Rican island of Vieques in October of 1999.  Protestors are still 
demanding today, that the Navy cease using Vieques for target practice and pull its 
installation located off of the island.
112
  Reputation damaging events such as this can 
severely limit or even restrict the military’s ability to conduct war-fighting training 
missions due to public opposition.  Because of the “Vieques Incident” the Navy has had 
to postpone or cancel training events that improve Naval war -fighting readiness and 
search for new locations to conduct this type of training.  
                                          
112  Heery, Bill, (2001) Bomb Training Could Shift To Avon Park, The Tampa Tribune, August 3, 2001, Final 
Edition. 
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Do non-military, civil-support operations have a positive or negative impact on 
unit readiness?  Are some support roles more politically sensitive than others?  Should 
the military accept some missions but reject others?  In this chapter, I will argue that 
military readiness is improved or degraded by the  type of law enforcement mission 
supported (rather than all support missions) and by the status (whether the military is 
under federal or state control) of the mission.  I will a lso show that military leaders must 
be concerned with politically sensitive missions along the U.S. -Mexico in order to 
maintain a high level of credibility necessary for public support for future training events 
and operations.   
 
A. WAR FIGHTERS OR POLICE? THE IMPACT OF BORDER LAW 
ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT MISSIONS ON MILITARY READINESS 
On April 20th, 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced that he 
believed that the National Guard should remain focused on war.  He further stated that he 
wants National Guard troops out of the nation's airports and off its borders as soon as 
possible.  “They are civilian functions, and they ought to be performed over any sustained 
period of time by civilians and by people who signed up to do that.”  Rumsfeld added, 




The statements made by the Secretary of Defense reflect the concerns of civilian 
and military leaders over the use of military personnel assigned “civilian functions” that 
will result in the weakening or loss of their combat skills and readiness for war.  Military 
leaders have always been wary of any non-military tasks that rob soldiers of precious 
training time needed to develop and sustain their warfighter skills.  In fact, active -duty 
Army units returning from peacekeeping missions around the world must go through a 
rapid retraining program that sometimes includes training rotations at the Joint Readiness 
Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana or the National Training Center (NTC), 
Fort Irwin, California to rebuild individual and unit proficiencies.114   
                                          
113  Postman, David, Rumsfeld Says Guard Should Be Focused on War, Seattle Times, April 20, 2002. 
114  Weible, Jack,  Congress to Consider Whether Pentagon Robs Military Readiness to Pay for Peacekeeping 
Efforts, Army Times, January 12, 1998, p. 4. 
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Have non-military, civil-support roles like the peacekeeping operations in the 
Balkans improved combat skills?  According to General David Grande (USA, Ret.), they 
do improve soldier skills and he insists that America’s fighting men should be able to 
move rapidly up and down the full range of contingencies “from brutal combat to 
humanitarian assistance.”115  A survey conducted by Charles Moskos, a Northwestern 
University sociology professor, seems to validate Gener al Grande’s position.116  The 
survey given to American peacekeepers in Kosovo indicated that nearly half (46%) of the 
soldiers surveyed disagreed that peacekeeping operations “weaken the warrior spirit”, in 
fact, an additional 37% thought that the Kosovo mission actually made them more 
prepared for combat.  Only 14% said the opposite.  
 
But the Unit Status Reports (USR) that indicates a military unit’s preparedness for 
war, and evaluations of the unit performance from the JRTC and the NTC seem to 
indicate otherwise.  The evaluators report that units returning from operations other than 
war (OOTWA) assignments have shown a decrease in their readiness to conduct their 
primary combat missions.  In fact early in 2000, both the 1st Infantry and the 10th 
Mountain Divisions, after lengthy peacekeeping operations, reported a C-4 combat 
readiness level (next to the lowest level possible) on their USRs.117  Can some OOTWA 
missions that support law enforcement agencies improve warfighter skills while others 
degrade those skills?    
 
B. THE RANGE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT MISSIONS 
In a recent article in Social Justice, Professor Timothy Dunn outlined the 
“spectrum of militarization of the U.S.-Mexico border.”118  In his outline (fig. 1), Dunn 
listed the support missions from least to most “militaristic.”  The list also describes what 
                                          
115  Author Not Cited, No They’re Not Incompatible, Economist, Aug ust 18, 2001, Vol. 360 Issue 8235, p. 22, 
2p, 1c  
116  Author Not Cited, No They’re Not Incompatible, Economist, p. 22, 2p, 1c. 
117  Lewis, Mark, Peacekeeping Deployments Erode Combat Readiness, Army Times, February 7, 2000, p. 62. 
118  Dunn, Timothy, (2001),  Border Militarization Via Drug and Immigration Enforcement: Human Rights 
Implications, Social Justice, Volume 28, No. 2, 2001, p. 24. 
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the support mission entails and indicates the type and level of soldier skills that would be 
practiced while performing the missions. 
 
Spectrum of Militarization of the U.S. -Mexico Border 
Less Militaristic (1) to Most Militaristic (11)  
                          
_________________________________________________________________________  
1. Military gives or loans equipment to Border Patrol (BP) and law Enforcement 
Agencies (LEA); 
2. Military troops operate and/or maintain loaned equipment; 
3. Military provides “expert advice” to BP and LEAs;  
4. Military construction for BP/LEAs; 
5. Military provides advisors and training for BP/LEAs;  
6. Military transports supplies, equipment, and personnel for BP/LEAs;  
7. Military aerial reconnaissance and surveillance for BP/LEAs;  
8. Military ground troops deployed on a small scale at or near the border, mainly 
recon for BP/LEAs; 
9. “Improved integration”- “total integration” of military and BP/LEAs efforts.  
Blurring of institutional lines bet ween military and BP/LEAs; 
10. Mass deployment of military troops at or near the border to perform a variety of 
border enforcement roles; 
11. Military granted authority to arrest, search, and seize civilians and property.  
Sections 1 through 3:  Allowed by the 1982 DoD Defense Authorization Law; added new 
chapter to U.S. Law, Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials .  This support 
is allowed for police bodies with jurisdiction to enforce drug, contraband, and immigration laws.  
Section 4 through 9:  Allowed by 1989-1991 Defense Authorization Laws, amending 1982 
provisions, specific to drug enforcement (broader in practice, however)  
Section 10 and 11:  Bills filed and debated in Congress; no laws passed.  
 
Figure 1.   Spectrum of Militarization of the U.S. -Mexico Border. 
 
Many of the MSCA missions listed above can provide training opportunities for 
service men and women to maintain and enhance their traditional warfighter skills.  For 
example, support missions that utilize a service member’s military skill like engineering 
projects, vehicle and equipment maintenance, and reconnaissance/patrolling operations 
can exercise and strengthen military job know-how.  As long as the tasks that the service 
member performs while supporting law enforcement authorities are iden tical or similar to 
their military specialties, MSCA missions become just a different training environment 
for improving warfighter skills.  
 
However many of these tasks fall outside of a service member’s military 
specialty.  For example, tasks like provid ing advice and training to law enforcement 
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agents, and the arrest, search/seizure of civilians and their property stray outside of 
traditional military skills.  Missions such as these, concern critics of MSCA operations 
because while conducting these non-military specialty tasks, service members can loose 
the skills needed to fight and win the next war.   
 
As mentioned above, the evaluations of active-duty Army units returning from 
extended deployments where non-traditional military operations were performed showed 
that warfighter skills and unit readiness were weakened.  Should the military reject law 
enforcement requests to perform tasks that have no military skills involved, or when a 
task is outside the scope of the service member’s warfighter job?  Can tasking the 
National Guard with law enforcement support duties have a different effect on National 
Guard readiness than the same duties have on active Army readiness?  The answer may 
be found in the way the National Guard Bureau organizes and operates its counterdrug 
program. 
 
C. THE NATIONAL GUARD COUNTERDRUG PROGRAM 
Beginning in the early 1990s, a majority of the states and U.S. territories began 
using their National Guards for counter -narcotic operations.  Each state and territory 
received federal funding to start and support counter -narcotic “task forces” designed to 
aid law enforcement agencies and community based organizations in their fight against 
the smuggling, manufacturing, distribution, and use of illegal narcotics.  Today these task 
forces consist of full-time, active-duty National Guard personnel that perform a wide 
variety of missions that range from occupying covert listening post/observation posts  
(LP/OP) along the U.S.-Mexico border to intelligence analysis to anti-drug 
demonstrations in elementary schools.  Many of the counter -narcotic missions are the 
same or at least complementary to the Guardsman’s military (warfighter) duties.  
However, there are other counterdrug missions that do not utilize traditional military war 
fighting skills.  These duties include video screen monitoring (scanning important border 
smuggling locations via cameras), radio room monitoring (listening to law enforcement 
radio traffic), and x-ray equipment operation at the points of entry to the United States.  
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Have conducting non-military tasks while supporting civil authorities had the same 
negative impact on National Guard war fighting abilities that they seem to have for the 
active Army? 
 
Some proponents of using National Guard troops to support civil authorities in  
domestic OOTWA missions believe that due to the special part -time status of the 
traditional National Guardsmen, proficiency in their military skills is not necessarily lost 
during these support missions.  They argue that National Guardsmen can maintain th eir 
military skills by continuing to participate in his unit’s Individual Duty Training (usually 
conducted on weekends) and Annual Training (two continuous weeks of focused 
training) when not performing civil support operations.  
 
To test this argument, a sixteen-month study was conducted by the Science 
Applications International Corporation (SAIC) for the National Guard Bureau’s 
Counterdrug Office to determine the effects that full-time, counterdrug support missions 
have on individual and unit readiness.119  The study consisted of a number of surveys to 
compare the readiness of individuals with full-time law enforcement support duties 
against their counterparts with civilian employment.  The indicators of readiness studied 
were:  Inactive Duty Training (IDT) and Annual Training (A/T) attendance, Military 
Occupational Specialty (MOS-Army)/Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) availability, 
physical fitness scores, Individual Weapons Qualification (IWQ), and compliance with 
height and weight standards.120  
 
The study found that servicemen and women with full-time law enforcement 
support missions have a higher than average (when compared with their civilian -
employed counterpart) IDT/AT attendance, physical fitness test scores, and IWQ scores.  
Additionally, the study found that many of the military personnel assigned to these duties 
                                          
119  National Guard Bureau-Counterdrug Office’s: Study on Counterdrug Personnel Combat Readiness -Executive 
Summary, April 3, 2001, SAIC, 1410 Spring Hill Road, Suite 400, McLean, Virginia  22102. 
120  National Guard Bureau-Counterdrug Office’s: Study on Counterdrug Personnel Combat Readiness -Executive 
Summary, April 3, 2001, p. 2.  
53 
had increased exposure to their military occupational duties and had gained Additional 
Skill Identifiers (ASI) through their law enforcement support jobs. 121  In short, the SAIC 
report indicated an overall improvement in individual readiness and warfighter abilities 
when National Guard personnel conduct civil authority support missions while 
continuing to participate in their military unit’s training exercises.  
 
The SAIC report validates the belie fs of the proponents for the using of National 
Guard for domestic, civil authority support missions.  But shortly after September 11 th, a 
new argument appeared with regards to the use of National Guardsman for civilian law 
enforcement support: Under what authority should the Guardsmen conduct the 
mission…federal or state?   
 
D. UNITED STATES CODE: TITLE 10 VERSUS TITLE 32    
A flurry of requests from law enforcement agencies for National Guard support of 
emergency security measures followed immediately after the terrorist attacks on 
September 11th.122  These requests, largely from federal law enforcement agencies 
responsible for security along the United States’ borders, stirred debates over the 
authority by which the National Guard should be activated.  The states argued that the 
National Guard troops should remain under the governor’s command (United States Code 
Title 32), but others at the federal level pushed for federalization of the National Guard 
putting them under the control of the active Army (United States Code Title 10).   
 
Titles 10 and 32 represent the United States Codes (USC) that authorize the 
federal armed forces (Title 10) and the National Guard (Title 32).  The title chosen for 
activating a National Guardsmen can have considerable impact on the Guardsmen’s 
active service.  For example, when a National Guardsman is activated under title 10 
                                          
121  National Guard Bureau-Counterdrug Office’s: Study on Counterdrug Personnel Combat Readiness-Executive 
Summary, April 3, 2001, p. 4. 
122  Rivera, Ray, Beefed-Up Border Security Delayed It'll Be A Month Yet As Feds Take Control , The Seattle 
Times, February 13, 2002. 
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orders, he becomes a member of the federal armed forces and “subject to the laws and 
regulations governing the Army or the Air Force”- no longer under the control of the 
governor of his or her state.123  While serving under Title 10 federal orders, the 
Guardsman’s activities are now severely restricted by the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 
that restrict soldiers and airman from enforcing civil laws.  
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized 
by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the 
Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the 
laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, 
or both.124   
Under Title 10 federal orders, the Posse Comitatus Act can place severe limits on 
the military’s role in civil law enforcement support mission along the Mexican border.  
More importantly for the question of readiness, activatio n under Title 10 status 
also relieves the Guardsman from duty to their state.125  Under conditions of armed 
conflict, federally activated National Guard units receive additional training in individual 
and unit war fighting tasks at the mobilization center.  However, individual troops or 
units activated for civil support duties under Title 10 orders would not receive training to 
sustain or enhance their warfighter proficiency.  Once activated under Title 10 authority 
for MSCA duties, National Guardsmen are no longer able to train in their military job 
skills, individually or as a unit. 
 
Contrary to Title 10 activation, a National Guardsman that is placed in Title 32 
status remains under the control of the governor and continues to be subject to the laws 
and regulations of their state.  Under this authority, the individual Guardsman and 
National Guard units continue their Inactive Duty Training and Annual Training events 
that build and maintain war -fighting skills while still supporting the law enforcement 
agencies. 
 
                                          
123  United States Code, Title 10, Subtitle E, Part II, Chapter 1211, Sec. 12405. 
124  United States Code, Title 18, Part 1, Chapter 67, Sec. 1385. - Use of Army and Air Force as posse comitatus. 
125  United States Code, Title 10, Subtitle E, Part II, Chapter 1211, Sec. 12405 - National Guard in Federal 
Service: status. 
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An example of how this can be accomplished is with the National Guard 
Counterdrug Program.  A cornerstone of the counterdrug program’s success has been its 
ability to provide valuable military assistance to law enforcement agency counter -
narcotic operations, while simultaneously continuing to participate in warfighter training.   
 
A special amendment to Title 32 requires this symbiotic relationship between 
civil-support duties and military training and ensures that:  
a. The National Guard of a State pursuant to a State drug interdiction 
and counter -drug activities plan does not degrade the training and 
readiness of such units and personnel  
b. The performance of the activities may not adversely affect the 
quality of that training or otherwise interfere with the ability of a 
member or unit of the National Guard to perform the military 
functions of the member or unit.  
c. National Guard personnel will not degrade their military skills as a 
result of performing the activities.  
d. The performance of the activities will not result in a significant 
increase in the cost of training.126 
The dual nature of Title 32 status allows a soldier to conduct law enforcement 
support duties without those duties having a negative effect on the soldier’s military 
skills.  Therefore, activating individual Guardsmen or National Guard units under Title 
32 authority can help protect against an erosion of military proficiencies while providing 
support to civilian law enforcement agencies along the U.S. -Mexico border. 
 
E.  THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF BORDER SUPPORT MISSIONS 
There are other critics of using the military for border security operations that are 
more concerned with the militarization of the U.S. border, not military readiness.  Groups 
that want reforms in U.S. immigration laws are not supporters of increased military 
presence along the Mexican border.  Many of these groups have taken their concerns over 
                                          
126  United States Code, Title 32, Chapter 1, Sec. 112, (C), (i -iii). 
56 
immigration issues to the federal and state governments, thus making military support to 
civilian authorities along the border a politically sensitive issue.  
 
One such group formed by Roman Catholic bishops, called the U.S. Conference 
of Catholic Bishops’ Committee on Migration, is urging the United States to reduce the 
militarization of the border with Mexico and adopt “softer” policies toward the 
immigrants coming from Mexico.  The group’s chairman, the Reverend Nicholas 
DiMarzio said in a written statement, “We must replace a policy which militarizes our 
border with a system which encourages migrants to enter legally and safely through 
points of entry.”127 
 
Derechos Humanos (Human Rights), a Tucson-based immigrants rights 
organization, also is fearful of increasing the military’s presence along the border.  
According to Randy Serraglio a spokesman for the group, “We’re objecting to  the war 
mentality on the border.  They keep increasing the budget and the number of Border 
Patrol agents in the area, and they’re turning it into a war zone.”128  The group recently 
held a march through Nogales, Arizona to protest what they call the militar ization of the 
border and mistreatment of illegal immigrants. 
 
Opponents to the use of the military for border security duty can also be found in 
the government.  Arizona State Representative Bobby Lugo fought a bill that would 
modify a law affecting the Arizona National Guard’s counter -narcotic operations.  “This 
was the camel’s nose.  If this was just a drug war we’re fighting, I’d be for it.  But, there 
are other things it would be used for.  You let the camel’s nose in, pretty soon you have 
the whole camel in the tent.  If you get National Guard, you get military down here.”  
Rep. Lugo warned.129  Representative Lugo is one of a group of southern Arizona 
legislators who fear that increasing the National Guard’s presence will include armed 
                                          
127  Ibarra, Ignacio, Bishops Oppose INS Policy, Arizona Daily Star; Tucson, Ariz.; September 9, 2001. 
128  No Author Cited, Nogales March Protests Border , Phoenix Gazette, Phoenix, Arizona; July 5, 2000. 
129  Webb, Catharine, National Guard Not Coming, The Bisbee Observer, Bisbee, Arizona; April 5, 2001. 
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soldiers patrolling the streets of small Arizona border towns.  Fears of another “Redford, 
Texas Incident” (discussed in detail in chapter three) in an Arizona border town have 
many people who live near the border concerned over the use of the military in their 
communities. 
 
The protests expressed by these groups and some legislators put political pressure 
on decision makers to be selective in the missions that they are willing to have the 
military support, especially those that are too politically sensitive.  In Arizona’s case, 
during the post September 11th terrorist attacks border security build -up, Governor Jane 
D. Hull prohibited Arizona Guardsmen and women from supporting the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service or the U.S. Border Patrol in public areas.  These organ izations 
could be aided by the National Guard only in areas that were not exposed to citizens from 
the United States or Mexico.  In fact, the Guardsmen assigned to border security missions 
were prohibited from supporting any agency even if it only could give the impression that 
they were aiding an INS or Border Patrol agent enforcing unpopular immigration laws.  
 
By ensuring that the National Guardsman were assigned to missions that did not 
support politically sensitive immigration laws, Governor Hull was ab le to provide the 
services requested by the border law enforcement agencies while avoiding angering 
groups that protest U.S. immigration laws.  As this example shows, missions that remain 
under state control are more likely to be conducted in a manner that  is sensitive to local 
concerns than those under federal control.  
 
The importance of the military maintaining a positive public image goes beyond 
whether a politician gets re-elected or not.  Negative public perceptions of the missions 
that the military conducts can result in a lack of citizen support for important legislation 
for the military, continued use of critical training sites, and the military in general.  
Perhaps the best example of the effects of negative public opinion on the military can be 
found in what is referred to as the “Vietnam Syndrome”.  The “Vietnam Syndrome” 
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describes the attitude of the American public after the withdrawal of U.S. forces from 
Vietnam in 1975 after failing to successfully end the war in that nation. 130  After the 
Vietnam War, the U.S. military fought to restore confidence, at home and abroad, in its 
ability to wage and win wars. 
 
On a smaller, but not less important scale, the National Guard must ensure that the 
MSCA missions that it assumes will not have an adverse effect on how the Guard is 
viewed by the local citizenry.  As stated earlier, the National Guard, like the military in 
general, needs popular public support in order to continue to enjoy favorable legislation 
and funding.  To do this, it may be necessary to carefully study each mission request from 
law enforcement agencies to identify missions (or portions of missions) that could cast 
the National Guard in a negative light.  Perhaps a different twist on the Title 10 vs. 32 
debate, should National Guard personnel be activated under Title 10 authority, the 
governor of the state not only looses command of the personnel, but also the ability to 
control the types of MSCA missions that they become involved in.  Once activated under 
Title 10 orders, the federal authorities controlling the operation will decide where and 
how the National Guard will support the civil authorities without regard for local public 
sentiment or politics. 
 
F. CONCLUSION 
Despite the concerns over the loss of warfighter skills and military readin ess when 
providing law enforcement assistance along the Mexican border, putting National 
Guardsmen in other civil support roles has not proven to have an adverse impact on 
military skills or unit readiness.  When activated under Title 32 authority, a Natio nal 
Guardsman can perform support duties to law enforcement agencies while still 
conducting traditional National Guard unit training on weekends and annual training.  
The National Guard’s Counter-Narcotic operations have demonstrated since the early 
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1990’s that blending civil support roles with National Guard military training can 
improve individual and unit proficiency and readiness.  
 
Leaders may find that despite the effectiveness of the mission for law 
enforcement agencies and unit readiness, that local political sensitivities may require a 
careful examination of where the military is best deployed.  The civil authority support 
roles along the border that could bring protests from different segments of the public can 
be avoided by shifting military assets to missions that are less controversial.  
Additionally, National Guard leaders and troops can be trained to be sensitive to, or to 
avoid, situations that might stir resentment in certain communities to their law 
enforcement support duties.   
 
Another improvement to effectiveness can be found by avoiding the hasty 
federalization of the National Guard.  Before National Guard troops are federalized, a 
clear understanding of the limitations that Posse Comitatus places on the amount and 
types of support missions that federal forces the can offer law enforcement agencies must 
be clearly understood.  Because of the nature of military support to civil authorities in 
crisis situations like the Los Angeles riots, federalization may actually reduce the 
effectiveness of the military’s support efforts and should be avoided.  Also, by keeping 
Guard troops under local control, mobilization processes can be conducted much quicker 
and less expensively than transporting personnel to a federal mobilization site (two states 
away as in the federalization of Arizona Guard personnel during the post September 11 th 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis described how throughout history the military has become involved in 
supporting civil authorities enforce the law along the U.S.-Mexico border.  Whether 
dealing with masses of armed, violent forces attacking Americans from across the 
Mexican border (Cortina and Villa raids), or narcotic traffickers employing advanced 
smuggling techniques, civilian authorities often have relied on the manpower and 
technical capabilities of the military to assist them with the threats.  Today, the active -
duty military and the National Guard provide personnel and equipment to assist federal, 
state and local law enforcement agencies conduct counterdrug operations on the 
southwest border.  
 
After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the military again responded to 
the requests from civilian authorities to provide troops for emergency security operations 
on the border.  Homeland Security has become an important issue and the new sense of 
national vulnerability has forced the United States to reexamine its domestic security 
posture.  Many civic leaders are arguing for an increased involvement for  the military in 
border security missions.  The proponents of using the military to support civil authorities 
tasked with keeping terrorists and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from crossing 
over the Mexican border argue that failure to take these steps equates to “national 
suicide.”131  The opponents, on the other hand, have voiced concerns over the 
effectiveness of MSCA missions, the increased possibility of military violations of 
human and civil rights during these operations, and the loss of the militar y’s readiness to 
fight and win wars while executing “non-warfighter”, civil support duties.  This thesis 
evaluated the validity of each of these concerns.  This chapter summarizes the main 
findings and recommends ways in which military support missions can  be executed 
effectively and with minimal negative impact on civil rights and military readiness.  
 
                                          
131  Congressman Tom Tancredo, Telephone Interview with Author, Monterey, California, August 27, 2002.  
62 
Chapter III presented evidence that shows that military support to civil authorities 
is generally very effective.  Civilian law enforcement agencies have bee n able to 
effectively capitalize on the resources that the military has offered to counternarcotic 
operations, civil disturbance control in Los Angeles in 1992, and post September 11 th 
U.S. border security operations.  These examples of military support to civil authorities 
illustrate how law enforcement officials have benefited operationally from the military’s 
well trained and disciplined personnel and advanced technology and equipment.  All this 
coupled with the military’s ability to deploy these resources very quickly enables the 
armed forces to provide highly effective support to civil authorities in day -to-day 
operations, like counterdrug missions, and also respond to requests for emergency aid, 
like in the cases of civil disturbances and other national crises.  
 
A great deal of the assets that the military offers to law enforcement agencies is 
unavailable anywhere else; by sharing these resources with agencies of all sizes, the 
military provides services that otherwise would be impossible for small, ru ral police 
departments to access due to their small budgets.  Also regardless of the agency’s size, 
the availability of military personnel makes it possible to shift law enforcement officers 
from auxiliary/administrative duties to actual law enforcement ac tivities.   
 
The episodes where the military has demonstrated the ability to provide effective 
support to civil authorities have also revealed areas that need to be addressed to improve 
the timeliness and types of military support.  In the case of the Los Angeles riots in 1992, 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the California National Guard’s deployment was 
degraded due to ineffective emergency planning by the civilian leadership in the city and 
county of Los Angeles.  In order to improve the speed of the deployment and the 
effectiveness of the military’s support to law enforcement agencies, detailed discussions 
and planning must be conducted to ensure the proper coordination is made between civil 
leaders and the National Guard in the case of an emergency.   Civil-Military contingency 
plans that are detailed and include realistic timetables for military responses will greatly 
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enhance the quickness of the military and the effectiveness of the support to civilian 
agencies. 
 
The effectiveness of military suppor t to civil authorities can also be improved by 
avoiding the unnecessary federalization of the National Guard.  For law enforcement 
support roles, it is unnecessary and sometimes unwise to federalize National Guard 
troops.  Once federalized, a Guardsman will fall under USC Title 10 laws and hence be 
limited by the Posse Comitatus Act.  This act places strict limits on the amount and types 
of support missions that federal armed forces can offer law enforcement agencies, but 
ordinarily places no restriction on a Guardsman.  In the case of the Los Angeles riots, the 
number of requests from civil authorities fulfilled by the military was greatly reduced 
when the California National Guard became federalized.  Because of the nature of MSCA 
missions, and the restric tions that Posse Comitatus imposes on federally controlled 
troops, the federalization of the National Guard for civil support missions should be 
avoided.  Additionally, by keeping Guard troops under local control, the mobilization 
processes can be conducted more efficiently and less expensively than a federal 
mobilization, which can involve the time consuming transportation of Guards personnel 
to a “mobilization station.”  For example, in the case of the Arizona National Guard’s 
post September 11th border security mission, once federalized, the troops were sent to a 
mobilization station over 300 miles from their duty stations.  
 
Chapter IV dealt with the concerns of other opponents of using the military for 
law enforcement support roles that are concerned over possible human and civil rights 
violations at hands of soldiers.  These opponents argue that the military is incapable of 
performing missions that require a great amount of restraint on the use of force.  The 
shooting of 18-year-old Esequiel Hernandez near Redford, Texas, in 1997 provides these 
critics with evidence that their fears are not unfounded.  Chapter IV has also shown 
however, that their argument is flawed by the fact that the “Redford incident,” however 
tragic, was one isolated occurrence among hundreds of other armed missions that 
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produce no human or civil rights violations.  Their argument also ignores examples of 
where the military has protected human rights by providing aid and comfort to illegal 
immigrants and narcotics smugglers who have come into peril in the desert. 
 
Perhaps more importantly, the chapter showed that the military had investigated 
the Redford shooting, isolated the causes, and had corrected the deficiencies by providing 
advanced training that produces personnel capable of  successfully conducting armed 
support missions that do not harm, and even protect the human and civil rights of both 
U.S. and foreign citizens.  The civil disturbance training that became a mandatory part of 
every National Guard troop following the Kent State shootings has proven to be effective 
when the National Guard has been called in to support law enforcement authorities.  This 
has been demonstrated during civil disturbances, counterdrug operations, and border and 
airport security missions that National Guard troops have been engaged in.  The civil 
support training and the “community-based” nature of the National Guard makes it 
“uniquely qualified” for many civilian authority support missions.  Based on that fact, 
Civilian leaders should first look to the National Guard for military support for missions 
of this type.  In cases where it becomes necessary to employ federal troops for law 
enforcement support operations, the active forces should receive civil authority support 
training very similar to what National Guard troops receive annually. 
 
Chapter V addressed the arguments from the opponents of MSCA operations who 
claim that missions of this nature that degrade rather than improve warfighter skills 
actually weaken unit and individual readiness.  While showing that in many cases the 
Unit Status Reports (USR) from some of the military organizations that have recently 
completed peacekeeping missions have indicated a reduction in readiness for war, this 
chapter has also shown that the type of unit deplo yed, and the mission executed, has a 
greater impact on readiness.  Using evidence from a National Guard Bureau study 
conducted by the Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), chapter V 
illustrated that members of full-time Nation Guard counternarcotic task forces actually 
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demonstrated higher levels of readiness for war than their part -time counterparts (those 
participating in weekend and two-week training events).   
 
In the case of full-time counterdrug personnel, combat readiness was enhanced by 
many law enforcement support missions that mirrored their warfighter duties and more 
importantly, by participating in their military unit’s training events.  This is an important 
point for understanding how combat skills can be maintained during civil support 
operations.  In this example, the troops are not totally pulled away from their warfighter 
skills training while executing law enforcement support mission.  On the contrary, unlike 
many active duty units that perform support to civil authority miss ions at the expense of 
combat training, National Guard counterdrug personnel are required to continue their 
participation in their unit’s combat preparedness training.   
 
This becomes another argument in favor of not federalizing Guard personnel for 
civil authority support missions.  As long as Guard personnel remain under their state’s 
control (USC Title 32), the Guardsman can continue sustaining warfighter skills with 
their unit during scheduled training events.  However, once federalized under USC Title 
10 authority for civil support duties, the individual and unit combat training schedule is 
eliminated until the return to Title 32 status. 
 
Chapter V also showed that some military support to civil authority missions that 
fail to gain public support could also have an adverse effect on readiness.  By using the 
example of the negative public reaction to the Navy’s accidental killing of a Puerto Rican 
security guard by an errant bomb on the Puerto Rican island of Vieques and the U.S. 
military’s loss of credibility during the Vietnam War, the chapter illustrated the 
relationship between the public’s opinion of military operations and combat readiness.  
Public relation considerations have affected the way Arizona National Guard personnel 
have supported different  law enforcement agencies along the U.S.-Mexico border.  Often 
there are elements within border communities that are deeply resentful of U.S. 
66 
immigration policies and therefore strongly protest the military’s support of the INS and 
U.S. Border Patrol.  This resentment and protest can result in a lack of support for the 
military by these communities and their elected representatives.  
 
It therefore becomes important for law enforcement support requests to be 
carefully reviewed to gauge them for possible adver se public reactions to the mission.  
The civil authority support roles along the border that could bring protests from different 
segments of the public should be avoided by shifting military assets to missions that are 
less controversial.  Additionally, military leaders and troops must be trained to be 
sensitive to, or to avoid, situations that might stir resentment toward their law 
enforcement support duties in certain communities.  
 
For over 150 years, the military has provided support to aid civilian law 
enforcement agencies along the border in times of crisis.  Proponents of military support 
to civil authorities have argued that armed with technologically advanced equipment, and 
possessing trained, disciplined personnel, the military can offer resources that are often 
unavailable to law enforcement authorities.  This paper has shown that the military is 
capable of providing support to civil authorities during emergencies on the southwest 
border that is effective, protects the human and civil rights of citizen from both sides of 
the border, and can so without a loss to its combat readiness.  If history is any indication, 
it is likely that military personnel will again be called to support law enforcement 
authorities on the U.S.-Mexico border for Homeland Security missions in the near future.  
By applying the lessons learned from past MSCA missions to future missions, they can 
be effectively executed, safe for rights of all citizens, and improve the military’s 
capability to fight and win the nation’s wars.  
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